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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
3	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
4	Case No. 12-12020-MG	
5	x	
6	In the Matter of:	
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8	RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al.,	
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10	Debtors.	
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12	x	
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14	United States Bankruptcy Court	
15	One Bowling Green	
16	New York, New York	
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18	July 24, 2012	
19	10:21 AM	
20		
21	BEFORE:	
22	HON. MARTIN GLENN	
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
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    (Doc# 90, 47) STATUS CONFERENCE RE: Motion Authorizing the
    Debtors to Continue to Perform Under the Ally Bank Servicing
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    Agreements in the Ordinary Course of Business. Marked-Up
    Documents: 47, 90, 118, 121, 218, 303, 366, 367, 385, 398, 424,
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    793
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    (CC: Doc# 507) DEBTORS' Application for an Order Under
 9
    Bankruptcy Code Sections 327(a) and 328(a) Authorizing
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    Employment and Retention of Centerview Partners LLC as
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    Investment Banker filed by Larren M. Nashelsky on behalf of
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    Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up Documents: 507, 703, 747,
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    831
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    (CC: Doc# 704) DEBTORS' Application for an Order Authorizing
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    Employment and Retention of Fortace LLC as Consultant to the
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    Debtors Nunc Pro Tunc to May 21, 2012 filed by Larren M.
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    Nashelsky on behalf of Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up
19
    Documents: 704, 827
20
    HEARING RE: Sale Order (CC: Doc# 538, 291, 292) Marked-Up
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    Documents: 291, 292, 538, 857, 858, 860, 862
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1 2 (CC: Doc# 529) APPLICATION Pursuant to Sections 328 and 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 3 4 Procedure 2014 for an Order to Retain and Employ Moelis & Company LLC as Investment Banker to the Official Committee of 5 Unsecured Creditors, Nunc Pro Tunc, to May 16, 2012 filed by 6 7 Kenneth H. Eckstein on behalf of the Official Committee of 8 Unsecured Creditors. Marked-Up Documents: 529, 703, 853 9 10 (CC: Doc# 526) DEBTORS' Application Under Sections 327(a) and 11 328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for Authorization to Employ and 12 Retain FTI Consulting, Inc. as Financial Advisor Nunc Pro Tunc to May 14, 2012 filed by Larren M. Nashelsky on behalf of 13 14 Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up Documents: 526, 703, 747, 850, 855 15 16 17 (CC: Doc# 720) DEBTORS' Application Under Section 327(e) of the 18 Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) and Local Rule 2014-1 19 for Authorization to Employ and Retain Severson & Werson PC as Special California Litigation Counsel to the Debtors, Nunc Pro 20 21 Tunc to May 14, 2012 filed by Larren M. Nashelsky on behalf of 22 Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up Documents: 720, 829 23 24

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1 2 (CC: Doc# 719) DEBTORS' Application for an Order Authorizing 3 Employment and Retention of Towers Watson Delaware Inc. as 4 Human Resources Consultants to the Debtors Nunc Pro Tunc to June 25, 2012 filed by Larren M. Nashelsky on behalf of 5 Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up Document: 719 6 7 8 (CC: Doc# 182) MOTION for Relief from Stay Motion of Shellpoint Partners LLC f/k/a Shellpoint Mortgage LLC and New 9 10 Penn Financial, LLC for Entry of an Order Modifying the Automatic Stay to Effectuate Termination Notice. Marked-Up 11 12 Documents: 182, 184 13 (CC: Doc# 320) STATUS CONFERENCE RE: Debtors' Motion Pursuant 14 15 to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Approval of the RMBS Settlement Agreements. Marked-Up Documents: 320, 321, 328, 392, 473, 481, 16 17 519, 705, 857, 858, 860, 862, 865, 866 18 19 (CC: Doc# 547) Motion to Extend Time/Debtors' Second Motion for Order Under Bankruptcy Code Section 521 and Bankruptcy Rule 20 21 1007(c) Further Extending Time for Filing Schedules and 22 Statements, Document#: 547. Marked-Up Documents: 540, 541, 542, 547 23 24 25

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    (CC: Doc# 659) MOTION for Relief from Stay, Document#: 659.
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    Marked-Up Document: 659
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    (CC: Doc# 274) MOTION to Dismiss Case or for Relief from Stay
    12-12020-mg Residential Capital, LLC. Marked-Up Documents:
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    274, 275, 280, 314, 315, 661, 682
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    (CC: Doc# 540) MOTION for Relief from Stay to Permit
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    Prosecution on Non-Bankruptcy Forum Action, Document#: 540.
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    Marked-Up Documents: 540, 541, 542, 802, 851, 852
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    (CC: Doc# 451) MOTION for Relief from Stay to Allow
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    Continuation of Pre-Petition Litigation. Marked-Up Documents:
    451, 807
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Just briefly, before we begin, I just want to briefly report and I apologize for the late start; I had a meeting in chambers this morning with the examiner, the examiner's proposed counsel and various other constituencies, creditors' committee's counsel, debtors' counsel, AFI's counsel, secured lenders' counsel -- there were a lot of people in chambers. I didn't get the identity of everybody who was in there. The conference was arranged to talk about the scope of the examiner's proposed investigation. The opinion that I issued ordering the appointment of an examiner indicated that the examiner, once he or she is selected, counsel should meet and confer with the various constituencies to try and arrive at an understanding or agreement as to the appropriate scope of the investigation.

Mr. Gonzales (ph.) and his counsel from Chadbourne have reported that they've done that and as a result of their discussions with various constituencies there's largely agreement about the scope of the proposed examiner's investigation. And at least at this early stage, about the examiner's estimate of how long an investigation might take, at this point there isn't a specific work plan but the -- as I say, the scope has largely been agreed to. They're going to see if they can iron out the last few points. The Court

intends to enter an order hopefully this week that will set the scope of the examiner's investigation. It's subject to possible modification as the examination goes forward.

With respect to the estimate of the length of time required to conduct and to complete the examination and report, the initial estimate is approximately six months. There are obviously some parties who think it should be shorter and there are some who may think that more time than that would be taken. I think at this stage, it's a good faith estimate by the examiner and his counsel as to how much time would be required. That may change as events unfold. I think the examiner fully understands the need to do this examination thoroughly, appropriately and as expeditiously as possible.

So I anticipate being presented with an order that I will sign and enter with respect to scope and the examiner is clearly underway at this point. With that, let's move forward.

MR. PRINCI: Good morning, Your Honor; Anthony Princi of Morrison & Foerster on behalf of the debtors.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Princi.

MR. PRINCI: Judge, we're here to review with the Court the proposed orders that have been submitted by various parties, respecting the 9019 motion that the debtor filed on June 11th. And there's three things, Your Honor, in that regard that I'd like to address today.

First, Judge, I'd like to explain why the proposed

order submitted by the trustees and the committee is grossly inappropriate. There are fundamentally --

THE COURT: But how do you feel about it?

MR. PRINCI: Well -- and hopefully, I'll elucidate why the adverb was appropriate.

There are four reasons for that, Judge, and I'm going to explain these in more detail. First, Judge, the provisions of that order essentially usurp the debtors' rights to proceed in the fashion that they're entitled to in connection with this motion.

Second, the procedures and associated time frame are not in the best interest of the estate. Third, those procedures as well, Your Honor, sort of turn on its head conventional procedural law that govern these sort of matters. And fourth, their proposed order as I'll get into in more detail, Your Honor, is based on a number of factual inaccuracies that Your Honor would have no reason to appreciate but which I will elucidate for the Court.

That's one thing I'd like to do. The second thing I'd like to do, Judge, is walk you through quickly our proposed order and why we believe that that is fair for all concerned and in the best interest of the estate. And the third thing, Judge, and perhaps most importantly, I want to suggest to the Court and the parties how I believe the two proposed orders can perhaps still be reconciled. So with that, Judge, let me begin

with the trustees' proposed order and I think I need to put
this in context because, as you'd imagine, the devil's in the
details here. So I think one thing I unfortunately have to
inform the Court is I am operating from a bit of a
disadvantage. The proposed order that Your Honor has from the
trustees and the committee, we, the debtor, only saw a draft of
that -- actually, we never saw a draft of it. We only saw that
proposed order Friday at 5 o'clock. So even though we were
here the last time, I think it was July 10, what happened
obviously is the committee and three of its members -- just let
me take a step back so you understand why the committee, I
think, why the committee is on board with this.

I think this is really driven by the trustees. When you look at the committee composition, you'll see that there are three trustees on the committee; there's Deutsche Bank, there's Bank of New York, and there's U.S. Bank. So that's three out of nine. Then you have two monolines, MBIA and FGIC. FGIC has joined in their order and field a brief in support of it. And MBIA has previously informed the debtor that it is not in favor of the 8.7-billion claim that is at the heart of the settlement agreement for which we made the 9019 motion. So I think it's understandable how the committee and three of its members ended up doing this together. It is unfortunate, Judge, as I'm going to explain at the end of this that we weren't given an opportunity to see a draft. And ordinarily

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when parties prepare draft orders, they circulate them. You have the usual caveats; I haven't shown my client, I haven't shown my mother, et cetera, et cetera. But you circulate it amongst all the parties. To get this at 5 o'clock on Friday --THE COURT: Let's pass beyond when you got it. MR. PRINCI: Okay. So with respect to the substance, Judge, let me first go back to the motion itself and what is the motion doing and who does the motion concern. The motion, Judge, concerns some of the largest institutional investors in this country. I think it might be helpful actually, Judge -let me just -- there are probably three to four dozens institutions, I'd say probably like four dozen institutions, Judge, that are signators to the settlement agreement. Amongst them are the following companies, Judge; AEGON Investment Management, Bank West, BlackRock Financial, Caterpillar Insurance Company, Fairlawn Capital Management (ph.), Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, First Federal Bank of Florida,

Goldman Sachs Asset Management, HBK Master Fund, ING Investment

Management, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Neuberger

20 Berman, PIMCO, Pinnacle Bank of South Carolina, Reliance

21 Standard Life Insurance Company, Rocky Mountain Bank of Trust,

South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Insurance,

23 Teachers Insurance and Annuity.

That is just a sampling of who the parties are, Judge, who want this to go forward on a time frame that gets to a

finish line consistent, Judge, with their interests.

Now, what the trustees have done with the committee is -- and obviously, these people want to move as quickly as is reasonably possible. I think, as I admitted to the Court before, we filed the motion on June 11th and quite candidly I think the time frame was too aggressive. And we heard people's issues there. And we have worked with people to try to give them information. But, Judge, you can't give people information and help them if they don't want information. So let me create this perspective for you.

We filed -- first of all, on May 14, which is the petition date, we announced publicly and in our first-day papers this settlement agreement. And we indicate we're going to make a 9019 motion to have it approved. We file that motion on June 11. Now that's a month-and-a-half ago. It's more than two months since the petition date. And you heard the trustees' counsel and you head the committee counsel here. This is the most important issue in the case. Okay.

You would think if it's the most important issue they'd be on it. But the trustees, to my understanding, have yet to hire a financial advisor. Now the committee hired a lawyer in one day. The committee hired three financial advisors in a few days. And the trustees who tell you this is so important to them have yet to hire a financial advisor. In terms of information, I stopped asking them, Judge, after

numerous calls and meetings we had with them. I stopped saying 1 2 to them listen, any time you want information we'll give you information. I stopped asking because I never got a response. 3 4 The first time they've asked for a single piece of paper was 6:30 on Friday the 20th, this past Friday. It's tokenism. 5 asks for things like -- well, let me tell you what it asks for. 6 7 This is the first time -- and again, they're the ones, Judge, suggesting that they need forever to do this but I guess I'd 8 need forever too if you don't get started. So after the 9 10 motion's been filed since June 11, this is the first time they've sought information with respect to the merits of the 11 12 8.7.

They asked for all information -- they ask for four things: all information that we provided to the institutional investors' counsel. They ask fo6 any information our experts relied on -- now, Judge, they had that expert affidavit the day we filed the motion, June 11. You wait until the eleventh hour for this hearing to suddenly decide you want to ask for the information that those experts relied upon. Does that suggest they're really diligently looking to see what the merits are of that 8.7? I think not.

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Then they ask for a list of all the trusts where the debtors serve in the capacity of depositor, seller, mass servicer, enter servicer. You want to just figure that out now? You want the list of the contracts now? I mean -- and

I'll get to how much information we've already provided them
which is entirely inconsistent with so many paragraphs in their
proposed order. So let me jump ahead, Judge, because I think
you get the point I'm trying to make.
When you look at their proposed order, it is not about
the investors' interests; it's not about this estate's
interest. It's about the trustees' interest and only the
trustees' interests. Let me start, Judge, by first pointing
out the factual inaccuracies that underpin this.
If you take a look at their proposed order, you look
at page 6
THE COURT: Mr. Princi, did you meet and confer face
to face to try and reach a consensual schedule?
MR. PRINCI: Tried my best, Judge. But I can't do it
myself.
THE COURT: Did you no, but that let me ask one
more time. Did you meet face to face to discuss reaching a
consensual schedule?
MR. PRINCI: Yes.
THE COURT: When?
MR. PRINCI: July 9th in the offices of one of the
counsel to the trustees.
THE COURT: And have there been any meetings since
then?

MR. PRINCI: There's been a follow-up phone call. It

1 was last --

THE COURT: Have there been any face to face meetings since then?

MR. PRINCI: No.

THE COURT: Have you tried?

MR. PRINCI: We have been communicating by e-mail. We have been providing them with all the information they have seeking from us. But when we asked them for this, they told us no, they hadn't finished working on it with the committee. So we didn't get it until you got it which was Friday at 5.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PRINCI: So, Judge, let's just get to the particulars of the order. If you take a look at page 6 and you look at paragraph 2, the first thing they want us to do is to file another motion and they call it the assumption and assignment motion. And they want us to file that motion. They say you'd file a motion by July 31st to assume and assign al the contracts that you seek to transfer in connection with the servicing sale -- it's a defined term -- that relate to any RMBS trust. Okay. The problem with that is we filed that motion on the petition date. That is the sales motion.

Now what the sales motion does, Judge, is it requires by July 25th, tomorrow, that Nationstar and the debtor provide an exhibit that lists all the contracts that are being assumed. We are timely going to do that. We have told the trustees for

weeks that we'll be doing that, that we're in the process of doing that. So they will have the list with all the contracts tomorrow, as per the terms of the motion. So that motion is already filed --

THE COURT: So do I just check off paragraph 2 as having been done?

MR. PRINCI: I think they'll probably have things to say about this, Judge, but I can't see what --

THE COURT: In your view, is it --

MR. PRINCI: It's done. We have a motion filed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PRINCI: It's scheduled to be heard on November 5th. What they want, which they're going to get tomorrow is the list of all the contracts. But what they don't tell you, Judge, what they don't tell you is with respect then to the next part where they talk about the proposed cure amount and they say what we want the Court to order you to do there is identify any and all existing defaults. Okay. So what have we done in that regard, Judge? We met with them on July 9th and we said look, our business people tell us that literally we don't have any breaches of our servicing obligations and therefore we think the cure amount is zero. Now we understand you folks are going to need to due diligence. And as I -- I'll say to you what I said to them. I said look, the law of big numbers tells me that there's some chance that well-intentioned

1	business people who believe that to be the case could make a
2	mistake. So let's get into the weeds here. Let's have you
3	folks start to do your due diligence. And we said we will make
4	available to you these business people. You get from your side
5	whoever the business people are or the securitization lawyers,
6	whoever it is, anybody you want, lawyers, financial advisors,
7	your business people, and we will produce these business people
8	to you so you can begin your due diligence. And then let us
9	know what documents you want to try to sustain that.
10	THE COURT: Stay with me. With respect to paragraph
11	2
12	MR. PRINCI: Yes.
13	THE COURT: is there anything that they've included
14	in paragraph 2 that hasn't already been done or will be done by
15	July 31?
16	MR. PRINCI: The offer is outstanding, Judge. We are
17	providing them with the people who can explain to them
18	THE COURT: That's not my question. I don't see where
19	there's anything in here about providing people to them to do
20	anything. It seems to require that the debtors
21	MR. PRINCI: We did it already. We told them it's
22	zero.
23	THE COURT: Okay. So
24	MR. PRINCI: Done already.
25	THE COURT: I'll ask my question one more time. Is

there anything contained in paragraph 2 that in your view has not already been done or will be done by July 31?

MR. PRINCI: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So I can check that one off, in your view?

MR. PRINCI: Then they want an inventory with respect to all the assigned contracts and the specific provisions that the debtors contend they will assume pursuant to the severing provisions. Well, there's a host of problems with this, Judge. Number one, as we informed the Court on July 10, the way we're going to "sever" which is to say leave behind in this estate the rep and warranty claims relating to the seller debtors, the originator debtors, putback obligations and yet transfer to Nationstar or whoever the highest bidder is, the servicing rights the way we're going to do that. And this motion will be forthcoming -- I think we'll have this filed, Judge, sometime in August. We're going to have the depositor debtors, those are the sellers, they are going to seek to reject those contracts and then the servicer debtors are going to make a motion to assume.

Now, what they've said to us is gee, well, what will this look like when it's done? They said give us a template. Can you redline it and show us what a contract will look like if you do this? We said sure and we gave that to them. So, Judge, when I look at this and I say to myself --

THE COURT: You're looking at paragraph 3? 1 2 MR. PRINCI: Par -- beg your pardon? THE COURT: You're looking at paragraph 3? 3 4 MR. PRINCI: I'm in paragraph 2, right. THE COURT: You're still in paragraph 2? 5 6 MR. PRINCI: I'm still in paragraph 2 because that's 7 the sever provisions. And with respect to these so-called 8 unenforceable provisions, we've tried to explain that under 365(f) we believe 365(f) covers all of those provisions that 9 10 either say you can't assign this contract or here's a condition and unless you meet this condition you can't assign it -- you 11 12 know, I can't be any clearer than that. I'm sorry if they 13 don't like the application of the law to the facts in this 14 case. But when you look at paragraph 2 you say to yourself 15 wait a second, why are you asking the judge to order all this? 16 We've been trying to work with you on all this. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Princi, that's not at all helpful. What I want to know, is there anything -- and I thought I had 18 19 the answer to this but I guess I don't -- is there anything in paragraph 2 which starts on page 6 and finished the top two 20 21 lines on page 7 --22 MR. PRINCI: Right. THE COURT: -- that either hasn't been, in your view 23 24 hasn't been done or won't be done by July 31 which is the 25 deadline they put in the paragraph? I thought you told me that

everything's been done. 1 MR. PRINCI: Well, just to be clear for the record, 2 3 Judge, we don't believe we should have to file another motion. 4 But other than caveat, Judge, which I know Your Honor understood, no. I think all of this has been taken care of 5 6 already. 7 What --8 THE COURT: Okay, so you say that the motion that you 9 filed on the petition date is the assumption and assignment 10 motion? 11 MR. PRINCI: Correct. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. PRINCI: Okay. So, Judge, that's the first part. 14 And what --15 THE COURT: But let me just -- I want -- so I'm clear. Maybe I'm behind you on this, but is there anything else in 16 17 paragraph 2 that you think is inappropriate or has -- you're telling me it's all been done. Well, they put a date of July 18 19 31. If it's been done, then it's not a problem for you. 20 MR. PRINCI: Judge, I know -- and I'm going to

recommend, Judge, the way I think these orders can be reconciled. And I know you don't want --

THE COURT: Can we do it my way, please?

MR. PRINCI: Sure.

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THE COURT: Tell me if there's anything in paragraph

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2 -- this is your last chance -- tell me if there's anything in
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 2
    paragraph 2 --
             MR. PRINCI: No, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: -- that you believe is inappropriate that
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    hasn't already been done or won't be done by July 31?
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             MR. PRINCI: I think it's already been done.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. PRINCI: Or --
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             THE COURT: That's your last and final answer on this
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    paragraph.
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             MR. PRINCI: Just give me one moment; I think it's
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    already been done, Judge.
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             Well, the July 25th is when we'll have -- tomorrow --
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    is when we'll have the list of the contracts. So, yeah, by
    July 31, all of this will be done.
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             Judge, where we have an issue with them is with
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    respect to paragraph 3 which then talks about objections that
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    they want to file based on any issues they see with the so-
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    called RMBS inventory. So you go back and the RMBS inventory,
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    Judge, is the list that has all the contracts that are going to
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    be assumed. We have no problem, Judge, working out a date by
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    which they can file an objection to that, but you don't need
    all this time, Judge, laid out here to deal with that. It's
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    just not -- particularly coming from a party, Judge, that
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    hasn't begun to do any real work here other than worry about
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its own exposure which I don't hold against the trustees the
fact that they're concerned about their own exposure. What we
have as the debtors, Judge
THE COURT: Tell me what's wrong with this I don't
want you to speculate about what their motivation is. I'm
interested in a schedule.
MR. PRINCI: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay? Tell me what's wrong with the
schedule they propose.
MR. PRINCI: Judge, I think the schedule that we
proposed makes a lot more sense
THE COURT: Where you know, I've got a ton of
papers. Do you have an extra copy of that? I've got their
schedule in front of me; I'm not sure that I can easily lay my
hands on yours.
Thank you, sir.
MR. PRINCI: Judge, in our proposal, we suggest very
specific dates and in connection with these dates, Judge, we
don't have any if you take a look at the last ordering
paragraph, we're suggesting that they file their objections by
July 30th.
THE COURT: And they want until August 20th.
MR. PRINCI: If they want more time, Judge, we'll give
them more time on that, okay?

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THE COURT: Well, July 30th, obviously isn't going to

work at this point. So I take it that you're objecting to the 1 2 August 20th date? MR. PRINCI: We are, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And what do you believe is an 4 5 appropriate date? 6 MR. PRINCI: If they need a couple more weeks, Judge, 7 we're happy to give them a couple more weeks post our July 30, 8 so August 14 would be fine. 9 The biggest issue -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. PRINCI: Oh, you're ready, okay. 11 12 Judge, there is unfortunately -- and I apologize for 13 the sense of he said/she said on this stuff -- but the biggest 14 issue, Judge, with the order you've been presented is the 15 second part of this which says in essence look, we're going to take some objections we had, cure claim objections, and we're 16 17 going to shelve them. And we're not going to shelve a certain 18 objection we have -- which they've defined, Judge, as 19 limited -- I have to get to the definition, Judge -- so on page 4 they have a definition called "limitation of future 20 21 performance". And they say at the bottom of that that because 22 the resolution of the scope of the obligations that must be 23 assumed may impact the bidding at the auction this issue must 24 be resolved prior to October 23.

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The reality, Judge, is it doesn't impact the sale at

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all. What it impacts is them. That's the indemnification provision, Judge. And what the asset purchase agreement says is that the present purchaser, Nationstar, is not going to be assuming any liabilities that arose from facts prior to the closing date. So the issue for the trustees is they're saying look, we have an indemnification right under these PSAs. Now you, Nationstar, are saying that you're going to assume those agreements and with that the indemnification obligation. But you, Nationstar, say you're only prepared to stand behind that for any acts or events that arise after the closing date that then give rise, let's say, to a suit against us. And admittedly, Judge, the trustees get sued a lot in nuisance lawsuits. And so they -- the indemnification, we understand their issue.

That's not going to affect the auction process; there's not going to be a sale because if somebody wants to insist on that, you either have to cure it or not. That's why we should have a hearing to find out what their cure claims are. And that's why we don't' want to hold this in abeyance. So we want their cure claims, Judge, and we're entitled not to have either some combination of uncertainty under a sword of Damocles hanging overhead. If they believe they have cure claims, we should set up a date to have those cure claims decided. And, Your Honor, we have done that. In our proposed order, that's what we say. So there's no reason to hold this

in abeyance.

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The biggest issue of all in this proposed order is paragraph 5(e). And that's on the last page, that's page 9. And I didn't understand what this was about and last night spoke to committee's counsel and what this is about, Judge, is if you go back to paragraph 5(c) where they say --

THE COURT: Let me just read (e) again. Hold on.

MR. PRINCI: Sure.

decide to opt in or opt out.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PRINCI: So this ties in with their earlier paragraph and how they want to do this.

THE COURT: Which paragraph are you talking about?

MR. PRINCI: It's the earlier subparagraphs in 5.

They say look, we're going to complete our evaluation by November 1 and that's where the good new lies, Judge, because in our proposed order, Judge, we too have a date quite similar. If you look at our proposed order and you look at paragraph -ordering paragraph 5, it says, "The deadline for the trustees to accept or reject the RBMS trust settlement will be the earlier of ten days after entry of an order approving the RMBS trust settlement or October 31, 2012." So we're very close

But what they want to do thereafter, Judge -- putting aside the little debate we have on whether we're off a week or

with them, Judge, in terms of the time that they should have to

so with them -- what they want to do is they want to say look, at that point what we'll do is we'll see if we can come to an agreement with you -- this is all in paragraph (c), 5(c) -- and if we can come to an agreement with you, you've got to file another 9019 motion. And then it says, "And on or before November 30, the RMBS trustees may file motions seeking court approval of the settlement." And then you look at paragraph (e) and it says, "In the event by March 31st, any court order that is conditioned to the effectiveness of the RMBS settlement has not been entered", then this thing can blow up.

What that's about, Judge, we believe and we fear, is the Article 77 proceeding that you heard about on June 25th. Now look, if they want to come up today and say we will not seek to make an Article 77 proceeding and they want to say you have jurisdiction, Judge, this we can work out. We are happy to do a couple of things that are important to them. Number one, we're trying to work with them on the indemnification issue I mentioned earlier. And Nationstar and we are in discussions to try to resolve that for them.

And number two, they have a concern which you heard day one on June 25th when we began discussing this, they have a concern about getting sued. Well, their parochial interest, Judge, we don't believe should hold up the show here. But that having been said, we want to work with them to try to help them. If they believe that this Court has jurisdiction to,

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under CPLR, Article 77, issue a ruling that says they have complied with their trust duties. If this Court has jurisdiction, we are happy, Judge, to actually work with them to set that up as part of the schedule. We're not looking to stand in their way of getting comfort. But what we can't do is let their desire for comfort stand in the way of our rights to move this case forward in a sensible way. And that's what their order does.

So there's a reason our order is simple and there's a reason their order is incredibly complex. And their order obfuscates what they're really still about. I know you don't like the fact that today I have been extrapolating what I believe their intentions are. But I've been living with these folks, Judge, since our last hearing and before that. And I haven't gotten cooperation. I haven't gotten document requests. They don't have an expert yet. And everything points to the fact, Judge, that they're only worried about their parochial interest. We are trying to work with them but the case has to proceed, Judge. And all those investors that I mentioned before, Judge, that's the reason why they entered into this settlement agreement, because they don't have the trust in these trustees to look out for their interests. So they took it into their own hands. And they and we should be allowed to get a ruling from you, Judge, as to whether you believe -- and we'll present a host of evidence for you when

you have this hearing -- whether you believe that that figure, 8.7 billion, was a fair settlement. And if they can't, Judge, get out of the way of their own parochial interest, it just shouldn't stand in the way of this case coming forward.

Judge, do you have any other questions?

THE COURT: I probably will but nothing there.

MR. PRINCI: All right. Thank you, Judge.

Let me hear from the committee first and then, Mr. Siegel, why don't you come on up?

MR. BENTLEY: Good morning, Your Honor; Philip Bentley of Kramer, Levin on behalf of the Official Creditors'

Your Honor, let me say at the outset that I'd like to make clear what the committees' goals are here because Mr.

Princi raised certain questions about our goals and I think it's important that we're clear on that subject. We actually share a lot of the debtors' goals, if not most of the debtors' goals, with respect to the order that Your Honor is considering entering. We share with the debtor the goal of maximizing the sale proceeds. We want to do anything we can to avoid a litigation process that might jeopardize that. We also share the debtors' goals in opposing any objections the trustees may assert to the sale process. We're actually joined at the hip with the debtors on that issue.

We've heard that trustees have lots of substantial

objections to the sale process. They've told us in detail what those are; we summarized the very briefly in our papers. As we mentioned in our papers, we actually think those objections don't have merit and we intend to work with the debtor to oppose those objections if they have to be litigated. But what drove our thinking with respect to developing this procedural order is that we're concerned that if the parties are forced to litigate those issues over the next few months it could chill the sale process. It could be damaging. And we're concerned that the debtors' process would force the parties to do that.

The one other thing I would say, Your Honor, is a question was raised about committee process and the process we've followed with respect to the debtor. To be very clear, Your Honor, we recognize, as I just said, that we're adverse to the trustees on some of the central issues here and whenever those issues have come up and whenever the issue of this schedule has come up in committee meetings, we've asked the trustees to recuse themselves. They have. The order that we've presented to Your Honor, we've negotiated at arm's length with the trustees, seeing them as adversarial to us in key respects. And we got a deal that we think is in the best interests of the estate.

One more comment at the outset, just about the process that we've gone through with the debtor leading up to today.

We actually reached out to the debtor on Tuesday. We struck an

agreement in principle with the committees back on Tuesday and I called the debtors --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The trustees.

MR. BENTLEY: I'm sorry, Your Honor; I misspoke.

Yes, with the trustees on Tuesday, Tuesday late in the day, and I called the debtors' counsel and left a voicemail Tuesday evening saying I have news to report relating to this schedule, call me back. They weren't able to get back to me until Thursday morning. We spoke at length at that time and I walked them through the approach that is now reflected in this order in some detail. We didn't actually share the actual form of order with them until it was filed because, I can tell you, Judge, we were still negotiating the language of the order until 4:45 Friday afternoon. So I do want to dispel any suggestion that we haven't been trying to work with the debtor. We have been. We hope to continue working with them.

In terms of Mr. Princi's comments, I think some of his comments reflect a not-complete understanding of what we're trying to achieve here and it may be our fault because the language of our proposed order doesn't reveal our intentions in a crystal clear fashion. And so I spoke with Mr. Princi yesterday evening -- I'm happy to continue to speak with him -- to clarify what our intention is and I'd like to do that with the Court.

Now Mr. Princi raised really three, I think, principle

objections to the order we're proposing. The first relate to 1 2 the details of paragraphs 2 and 3 and as Your Honor, I think, made clear, I'm not sure there's really a lot that's in dispute 3 4 as to those paragraphs. In any event, the details of those 5 paragraphs, for example whether the trustees' deadline is 6 August 14 or August 20, we'd like to step aside and leave that 7 to be an issue to be discussed or argued between the trustees and the debtor. 8 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question first. Mr. 9 10

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question first. Mr. Princi argued that the debtor should not be required to file what you refer as another assumption and assignment motion. He said -- this is paragraph 2 of the trustees' and committee's proposed scheduling order -- he said they did that on day one of the case. You agree or disagree that -- does the motion that was already filed satisfy what's been drafted in paragraph 2?

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MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, and I apologize if this is not as helpful to the Court as it might be, but that's exactly the sort of issue where I do think it's better responded to by the trustees than by us.

THE COURT: You've signed onto this --

MR. BENTLEY: Understood, Your Honor. And --

THE COURT: What's your position? I'm not letting you off the hook.

MR. BENTLEY: Our suggestion, Your Honor, is there are

details in paragraphs 2 and 3 as to which we think further due discussion might be helpful, particular --

THE COURT: Answer my question. Does the motion that the debtor has filed -- I asked Mr. Princi -- it took a lot of time, a lot of questions to get what I thought finally was a clear answer -- but I asked the question whether the debtor has already done or will by July 31st all of those things that are required by paragraph 2. One of those things relates to this filing of an assumption -- what is defined as assumption and assignment motion. Mr. Princi's position is that was done on day one of the case. What is the committee's position?

MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, we do not have a position on

THE COURT: Come on.

that.

MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, we are not opposed to the position Mr. Princi took.

THE COURT: All right. You know, you can't -- if you're going to participate in this process, if you're going to suggest a scheduling order, you have done that, you have suggested this specific scheduling order I'm asking you about, you need to have a position whether the debtor has already satisfied what you propose to require. I will not accept "we don't have a position". You have to have a position.

MR. BENTLEY: If I may, Your Honor --

THE COURT: If you don't have a position, then go sit

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MR. BENTLEY: If I may, Your Honor, our position is we believe that this is an appropriate requirement to impose on the debtor --

THE COURT: That doesn't answer the question.

6 MR. BENTLEY: I understand, Your Honor, but as to 7 what --

THE COURT: Can you answer my question, Mr. Bentley, yes or no?

Did the motion that the debtor filed at the outset of this case fulfill the requirement of the order you're proposing that I enter? Yes or no?

MR. BENTLEY: We think it did, Your Honor,

THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on to the next point.

MR. BENTLEY: Okay.

As I heard it, Your Honor, Mr. Princi raised two other issues, two other concerns about this order. The first one is he said we don't want the sword of Damocles hanging over the parties' heads. And what I believe he meant by that was that he thinks that under our proposal, there's a threat that won't be resolved until sometime after the sale hearing, the November 5 sale hearing, that the trustees could assert that they have claims against the buyer, a threat that the buyer is not taking the assets free and clear of all trustee claims. That, Your Honor, we think is mistaken and we tried to address that

clearly in the order and I think we did.

THE COURT: Walk me through that.

MR. BENTLEY: Yes. Certainly, Your Honor.

That's addressed in paragraph 4 of the order. And what that paragraph says, Your Honor, is it says the trustees will not object to the assumption and assignment of the PSAs free and clear of any lien, claim or encumbrance. We think that's as clear as it could be and we think that will give any buyer the comfort that there is no threat hanging over its head.

The essence of the deal that we struck, Your Honor, as reflected in this paragraph, is the trustees have said yes, we have sale objections; yes, if we don't settle or if Your Honor doesn't enter this order we, the trustees, would object to the sale and say we do have claims against the buyer. But they've said in the context of this order they would withdraw those objections and instead, agree to reserve all of those issues until after the sale hearing. And then if they haven't settled -- and the hope is that they would have settled by the November 15 deadline; if they did settle that would resolve the sale issues as well as the RMBS issues -- but if they haven't settled by November 15, litigation would then commence as to those issues and their agreement is that any claims they've provide up, at most the remedy they would have would be a cure claim against a portion of the proceeds of the sale.

1 THE COURT: Show me the language in here that does 2 what you've just described. MR. BENTLEY: Yes, Your Honor. It's paragraph 4 3 and --4 THE COURT: I see the paragraph 4 language. How does 5 6 that mesh with what's in paragraph 5? 7 MR. BENTLEY: Okay, well two parts. First, the 8 language I referred to earlier that they won't object to the 9 assumption free and clear -- assumption and assignment free and 10 clear. And then it goes on to say provided that the sale order provides that the cure claims -- and I'm paraphrasing, Your 11 12 Honor -- will have administrative expense priority in the case 13 and attached to the sales proceeds subject to liens. And it 14 then goes on to say for the avoidance of doubt, the amount of 15 the cure claims shall not exceed the sale proceeds. And "sale proceeds" is defined in an earlier paragraph to mean a portion 16 17 of the overall sale proceeds. 18 THE COURT: But what rights are being reserved in paragraph 5? 19 MR. BENTLEY: Their right to litigate the amount of 20 21 their cure claim. Now that litigation will have a number of 22 different facets to it. So, for example, Your Honor's aware 23 that they're objecting to the severance of some of these 24 agreements. And the way that plays into the cure claim is to

the extent any obligations cannot be severed then any breaches

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of those obligations would give rise to a cure claim. So
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    severance and cure are joined at the hip. And we would
    contemplate if there were no settlement, all of those issues --
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    I'm sorry, Your Honor. I keep hitting -- all of those issues,
    severance, cure, would be litigated and would yield a result,
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    an amount of their allowed cure claim.
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             THE COURT: That won't exceed the sale proceeds.
             MR. BENTLEY: Correct.
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         (Pause)
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             THE COURT: In paragraph 5(c) --
             MR. BENTLEY: Yes, Your Honor, the RMBS settlement
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    that's referenced in 5(c) is, what, settlement of the cure
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    claims?
             MR. BENTLEY: It's settlement of what's defined as the
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    disputed matters which is defined earlier in paragraph 5 to
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    include both the cure claims and all other sale-related issues
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    plus the RMBS disputes that relate to the amount of the general
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    unsecured claim.
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             THE COURT: So what --
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         (Pause)
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             THE COURT: Just walk me through. The RMBS claim
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    settlement is what?
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             MR. BENTLEY: The RMBS -- the proposed RMBS claim
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    settlement is the settlement that the debtors are seeking
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    approval of.
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THE COURT: Okay. And this order would put off 1 2 consideration of that until when? MR. BENTLEY: The basic difference -- the fundamental 3 4 difference between this order and the debtors' proposed order is both our order and the debtors' order give the trustees a 5 6 deadline that's pretty similar, either October 31, in the 7 debtors' case; November 15, in our case. The difference is the debtors would ask Your Honor to approve their settlement offer 8 earlier in October before it's been accepted by the trustees. 9 10 We would say that should be deferred and that if there is a settlement announced by the November 15 deadline, the trustees 11 12 would then file -- I'm sorry -- the debtor would then file an 13 amended 9019 motion which would seek approval of the settlement 14 that at that point it actually would have reached. 15 THE COURT: So this schedule would give no effect to 16 the proposed settlement that the debtors have reached with the 17 investors who have given directions to the trustees to approve 18 the settlement. MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, if I --19 THE COURT: Do I understand that correctly? 20 21 MR. BENTLEY: I think Your Honor has it partly right. 22 THE COURT: Which part do I have right and which do I 23 have wrong? 24 MR. BENTLEY: Okay. The part you have right is we

would -- under our schedule, the Court would not be ruling on

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any settlement until such time, if any, as a settlement is
reached with the trustees. So if that's what Your Honor meant,
that's correct.
The part where I think the answer may be no is we do

think that the settlement the debtors have reached with the trustees is significant. And we don't want to just brush it aside and treat it as having no consequence. We do think, as we've pointed out --

THE COURT: The settlement they reach is not with the trustees. It's with the holders of more than twenty-five percent of various classes of RMBS securities, am I correct?

MR. BENTLEY: That's absolutely right. And so, as we said in our papers --

THE COURT: And the trustees don't want to be forced to have to deal with that.

MR. BENTLEY: If I may, Your Honor, our view as to the significance of that is (1) Your Honor's absolutely correct, if I understand your suggestion, that it doesn't have any binding effect on the trustees.

THE COURT: What doesn't have a binding effect on the trustees?

MR. BENTLEY: The settlement between the debtors and the investors.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BENTLEY: No binding effect on the trustees.

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THE COURT: Well, we'll see. But --

MR. BENTLEY: We do think it may have some persuasive effect on the trustees.

THE COURT: So does the debtor. And that's why they want to go forward with that 9019.

MR. BENTLEY: Well, and we agree with the debtors on that point. We just think that under our structure, it would have the same persuasive effect. We think that's important. We don't want to throw that away. But we don't think it's in any way diminished under our structure because our structure says November 15, just a few weeks after the debtors' deadline, Trustees, you'll have to either say yea or nay.

THE COURT: No. You want -- the proposed schedule that you have, you and the trustees, basically would have a new round of settlement negotiations between the trustees and the debtors and, I suppose, the committee. And only upon the successor failure of that -- well, what happens if the trustees and the debtor are unable to reach agreement? What happens?

MR. BENTLEY: Then we flip into litigation. And this is addressed in paragraph (d) -- 5(d) of our order which says if a settlement hasn't been finalized and filed by November 15 then the parties submit a litig --

THE COURT: Then you want to start a new schedule all over again. That's not going to happen, okay? We're coming out of this. I'm not saying this is the schedule or theirs is

1 the schedule. That's not going to happen.

MR. BENTLEY: We expect it could be very short, Your Honor, because we do expect --

THE COURT: Well, I don't plan to wait until November 15th to set a schedule for some future litigation. It's not going to happen, Mr. Bentley.

MR. BENTLEY: Well, Your Honor, I want to be clear.

I'm not sure we're proposing something different than what Your

Honor has in mind. If you look --

THE COURT: Am I reading these words wrong? "If a settlement of Disputed Matters is not finalized and filed with the Court on or before November 15, 2012, then the parties shall submit to the Court a litigation schedule on the Disputed Matters."

MR. BENTLEY: Litigation --

THE COURT: I'm not waiting until November 15th for a schedule.

MR. BENTLEY: Okay. Fair enough, Your Honor. I just wanted to point out that paragraph 5(a) does say discovery starts now. So discovery is not being held in abeyance until November 15 -- it's starting now. And if Your Honor wants to set the litigation schedule now, we don't object to that, Your Honor. We don't object --

THE COURT: Did you try and come up with a comprehensive schedule? I don't want to leave uncertainty in

anybody's mind about how this matter is going to proceed from a 1 scheduling standpoint. Okay? Whether the trustees have been 2 diligent or not diligent in pursuing discovery so far or 3 4 retaining experts, I, frankly, don't care. What I care about and what I want -- I want everybody on the same page that you 5 6 know this is what the schedule's going to be. It can 7 accommodate further negotiation efforts to resolve issues and I hope that occurs. But if it doesn't, everybody's going to know 8 this is the deadline by which I have to do various things. 9 10 There will undoubtedly be further orders from the Court, procedure orders, about how any contested hearings will go 11 12 forward. That doesn't have to have that level of detail. But 13 I don't want anybody under any misimpressions. I don't want to 14 come back in November and have anybody saying, well, the 15 hearing should be next week and so the schedule should be -you know, everything gets filed tomorrow. That isn't going to 16 17 happen. Nor am I going to hear from the trustees that we were 18 unable to resolve these disputed matters and so we have a 19 schedule that takes us out a few months. That isn't going to 20 happen. 21 MR. BENTLEY: We're happy to address these issues now, 22 Your Honor, if Your Honor thinks it's helpful to have us go out into the hallway and try to --23

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THE COURT: Well, you're not going to go out --

MR. BENTLEY: -- fill in those holes.

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THE COURT: -- into the hallway. But I'm telling you, what I am going to order direct is that after the hearing today, I want the counsel to meet face-to-face day to day until completed with a comprehensive schedule. And if there are competing provisions with dates, put them both in and indicate who supports which one and who opposes which one. And I'll resolve it. Okay? But I'm not going to deal with two totally different structures of orders that some of which leave dates way too open and say come back in November and we'll talk about a schedule. That's not acceptable. Okay. I don't care -- I'm not casting blame for where you all are today. The fact that there may have been one face-to-face meeting weeks and weeks ago and exchange of e-mails, that lies in everybody's court. That's unacceptable. Okay. What's going to happen is you're going to meet day-to-day, all day if necessary, and you're going to try to hammer out a comprehensive schedule that fills in -- and to the extent parties disagree, you'll come in at a separate hearing very soon and we'll iron it out. But what I have before me, these two proposals -- I have to read tea leaves to understand what the committee and the trustees are proposing. Okay? I don't like to read tea leaves. MR. BENTLEY: We're happy to follow Your Honor's

suggestion.

THE COURT: Tell me why I shouldn't go forward and hear the 9019 that the debtors filed and any objections to it

before the rest of these procedures that you've proposed. 1 2 mean, aren't the debtors entitled -- it may not get approved. And there may be some very substantial problems with it. And 3 it may get rejected. Okay? They filed the motion. They want 4 5 a hearing. There's a proposed schedule. You agree or disagree 6 but the schedule you proposed is one that puts a whole bunch of 7 other things in the way of the Court hearing it. That's the way I perceive these differences. Okay? So why shouldn't I go 8 9 ahead, for better or worse, and decide the 9019 that's already 10 been filed and not wait to see whether there's some new 9019 11 that'll be filed or not? 12 MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, one concern -- I have a few 13 concerns about that. One concern is what we're proposing to 14 you does rest on an agreement with the trustees. And Your 15 Honor will have to ask the trustees if they would still be

prepared to make the concessions they're making as to the buyer taking free and clear, if Your Honor were to impose that structure, that schedule. That's issue number one that I have,

The second is --

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Your Honor.

THE COURT: So if they don't get all their cards, they're going to go home.

MR. BENTLEY: If Your Honor can get their consent to this, God bless. Your Honor, we've done our best and this is the deal we've been able to strike.

THE COURT: But you'd not sat down with the debtors' counsel to see whether within these two proposed orders that I have. There's common ground that can be achieved that still includes this consent to a free and clear sale but comes closer to accommodating what the debtors' needs and interests are. That hasn't happened.

MR. BENTLEY: We've had a number of intensive discussions with Your Honor (sic) that did take place over the phone rather than face-to-face. But we have had a number of intensive discussions with the debtors.

THE COURT: Anything else you want to note?

MR. BENTLEY: I just want to respond to the one other concern that Mr. Princi raised about the Article 77 process. And I want to make sure that the committee's position on that is clear. And that is, we recognize that the trustees may ask Your Honor to review the fairness of the settlement as to the certificate holders, as to the beneficiaries. We recognize that there is a big issue as to whether Your Honor has jurisdiction over that or not and we don't wish to prejudge that issue. What we've said to the trustee is if they want to file that motion and ask Your Honor to consider we certainly aren't going to try to stop them from filing the motion. We have said, though, that we don't want any motion of that sort to delay the consummation of a settlement. That is, if a settlement is reached, we want it to be clear that that

settlement will become final within a limited period of time
and will not be delayed indefinitely while they try to get this
approval that they would like to get. The order that we've
submitted to the Court is consistent with that approach.
THE COURT: How is it consistent with that approach?
MR. BENTLEY: The order contemplates that they may
file a motion of this sort. That's in paragraph 5(c). It says
if they are going to file a motion of that sort, they have to
do it no later than November 30. But it doesn't say anything
about the outcome of that motion or whether Your Honor
dismisses it for lack of
THE COURT: It's what I was talking about, tea leaves.
I mean
MR. BENTLEY: for lack of jurisdiction.
THE COURT: The description in paragraph 5(c), one had
to read tea leaves to understand what type of motion this
potentially contemplated.
MR. BENTLEY: It was deliberately vague, Your Honor,
because the trustees have not yet come to rest on exactly what
sort of motion they plan to file. But that's why I did want to
make clear to Your Honor what's intended here and why it was
drafted the way it was.
The other provision that bears on this, Your Honor, is

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THE COURT: Yeah. Could you walk me through it?

paragraph 5(e). And this provision is a bit of a mouthful.

MR. BENTLEY: Yes. I will, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: 'Cause I see getting to March 31 and then have everything blow up because the trustees decide, nah, we're not going to waive the condition. And so, we're just going to walk away. Let's go back to square one.

MR. BENTLEY: The key point that I'd like to make, Your Honor, is paragraph (e) is predicated on an assumption, something that may or may not happen. It says in the event there's a -- that the settlement is conditioned on a court order being entered. We do not want to -- we certainly do not want to give the trustees the right to insist that any settlement they reach with the debtors have a condition subsequent of that sort. And this does impose any such requirement on the debtors. And if we need to make that more clear, we're happy to because I understand the debtors read it differently than we intended. But the trustees certainly can ask the debtors whatever they want. They can ask the debtors to include a condition subsequent. Frankly, we would hope that the debtors say no. But the point of this paragraph is that if the debtors were to say yes and if that order weren't obtained by March 30 then we would say enough. The point of this is to say you can't hold up the process indefinitely. At most, you can hold it up till March 30th in the event, which we hope is unlikely, that the debtors have agreed to give them a condition subsequent of this sort. That's the intended effect of this

1	provision. And as I said, if Your Honor thinks it needs
2	clarification, we're happy to clarify. All of these provisions
3	were drafted in some haste.
4	THE COURT: You say they were drafted in haste. Where
5	have you all been? I mean, this issue, the need for a
6	schedule, has been clear for a very long time. The status
7	conference has been adjourned before. It got put on for today.
8	And now I hear that orders you know, Mr. Princi's
9	complaining he didn't see this order till it was filed on
10	Friday. And each side you know, that's unacceptable.
11	MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, I do think that the language
12	here accomplishes its effect.
13	THE COURT: Okay. We'll see.
14	MR. BENTLEY: But I admit that the intent behind it
15	needs to be unpacked a bit.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from Mr. Siegel.
17	MR. BENTLEY: And so, that's what I was trying to do
18	for Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Siegel.
20	MR. SIEGEL: Good morning, Your Honor. First of all,
21	I apologize
22	THE COURT: Just make your appearance for the record,
23	Mr. Siegel.
24	MR. SIEGEL: Glenn Siegel on behalf of Bank of New
25	York now as one of the RMBS trustees. As I said other times

when I've gotten up, we try to speak collectively. I'm sure my colleagues will pipe up if they need to, if I've left something out or I've said something different than what their position is. But as a general matter, you should assume that we're speaking collectively.

Your Honor, based upon the discourse between you and the debtors' counsel and the committee's counsel, I'm kind of throwing out my presentation and I want to hit upon some points and I want to answer whatever questions you have.

I want to work backwards for a moment because there was one thing that Mr. Princi said that I took some -- I felt good about.

THE COURT: You felt good about?

MR. SIEGEL: I did.

THE COURT: Did you hear that, Mr. Princi?

MR. PRINCI: Only one?

MR. SIEGEL: Yeah. Only one. Sorry.

THE COURT: Take what you can get.

MR. SIEGEL: The idea that somehow the trustees expect that this Court is going to wait around while we get an order under Article 77 in New York state court is not on the table and we're not asking for that. Let's just start with that. We recognize that in order to meet the needs of this case, there has to be some sort of an expedited process. And what we have done was we have come up with what we think is an expedited

process that streamlines things so that we can reach at an endpoint that we think is not disruptive to the administration of the estate generally. And to be clear, the March 31st day is based on an assumption that the debtor can contest because the reason we have a March 31st date -- and I appreciate everybody wants to characterize this as the trustees' parochial interests. But what this is really designed --

THE COURT: You know, I'm really not moved by any of that.

MR. SIEGEL: Well, but --

THE COURT: If you and your client -- if you aren't looking out for your client's specific interests, I'd be shocked. So that has no -- that argument doesn't resonate. Okay?

MR. SIEGEL: But I do want to mention that there are other parties here involved. As Your Honor has said, we have received our letters, which we've now attached to our pleadings so you can see the letters we've received, that represent -- or represent twenty-five percent of some group of 390 of approximately 500 trusts that are suggesting to us that we do this deal. From our standpoint, it is important in this process we're describing to let the other certificate holders have an opportunity as well to decide what they want to do. We have sent general notices out but we think there's a formal process that's useful. It does have the benefit of protecting

us as well. But it also has the benefit of letting those people have their say. And I want to let that go.

THE COURT: Well, the better you are -- it doesn't mean you pers -- the better collectively the process allows as many of the investors to sign on, the more likely they're going to get the trustees to go along. So I think building in time, not too much time, but building in time that would encourage as many as possible to sign on makes it more -- this, from my standpoint, was an unusual provision because I've previously dealt with indenture provisions that allow trustees to take certain actions if a majority or two-thirds, depending on the indenture, direct certain action. I've never seen one that said twenty-five percent.

MR. SIEGEL: This is -- what's unusual about these deals, generally, is they live in the structured world. So they don't look like the typical deals. And moreover, one of the additional difficulties we have is because of the structure of these deals and because of the need for off-the-balance sheet treatment which people gave opinions for, these obligations cannot be ResCap obligations. They have to be trust obligations. And that's why we're here in the first place talking about what we're talking about.

I would note, Your Honor, this March 31st date presumes, based upon our estimate, as to what a suitable period of time to give the certificate holders is to file objections.

THE COURT: Mr. Siegel, did you sit down with Mr. 1 2 Princi --MR. SIEGEL: We did not. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. You're going to do that. 5 MR. SIEGEL: Understood. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. SIEGEL: And we will do that. THE COURT: We don't have to spend more time on the 8 date now. It may or may not be appropriate. After you explain 9 10 your concerns and interests and what's motivating it and he explains his, you hopefully will resolve the issue. 11 12 MR. SIEGEL: And the other point that we want to make 13 very clearly is -- and I appreciated what Mr. Princi said about 14 outstanding objections to the sale and not creating problems to 15 the sale. And I think that Mr. Princi and his client will have the opportunity to object to the limited number of sales 16 17 objections we've reserved. 18 THE COURT: Respond to the objections that you're going to file. 19 20 MR. SIEGEL: That's exactly right. And those limited 21 number of sales objections relate to two things. 22 relate -- which are basic and we could not take them out and move them into the cure claim corner. 23 24 The first thing is simply whether or not the purchaser 25 can perform going forward. By the way, we have no reason to

believe they can't. But we can't turn that into a cure claim. And the other is simply our understanding of what obligations going forward the purchaser's going to undertake. Mr. Princi is correct that that principle obligation has to do with indemnification. But it's not just indemnification of the trustees. It's indemnification of the trust. The question is who will bear the cost of these particular charges. You know, the example -- I think I gave it at the last court hearing. But the classic example is three months after the closing, a lawsuit arrives and some county in some state is suing for unpaid taxes for the last three years.

The question is what will the successor servicer do with that. There are two issues that attach to that. One is, will they pay the ongoing expenses and will they defend the litigation. We believe that under the current document as written, the APA, that they will now. Now Mr. Princi has said that they're making efforts to change that and we appreciate that. But until that happens, we have to reserve on the objection.

The second point is who pays the judgment. And that's a different issue. And that may very well not be something -- we think that issue is something that's a little thornier and that we'll have to work out. But that's also a genuine objection that we don't think we can shift into the other corner.

THE COURT: Let's go back to schedule. We're not arguing the whole --

MR. SIEGEL: No, no, no. I appreciate it. And I apologize for how cryptic this document is to you, Your Honor. But we have thought very hard about these things and I'm happy to answer any questions, including scheduling questions, that you have.

THE COURT: This is almost in the nit category. But Mr. Princi started by saying they've already done that your paragraph 2 requires.

MR. SIEGEL: Well, I do have a suggestion although I'm not sure it's the best resolution. But we filed an objection to their initial motion. One of the objections we filed is that they did not do what was necessary to bring before this Court the issues associated with assumption and assignment of these contracts. That's our objection. We say they have not said what they're doing in any detail in a way that we can respond to it.

THE COURT: Well, they said they're going to file schedules by the 31st.

MR. SIEGEL: Okay. So that tells us which contracts. It doesn't really tell us what they're going to do with it. You know, with due respect to Mr. Princi, and I do believe that they've been acting in good faith trying to get us information, but we didn't get an NDA signed until I think yesterday. And

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I'm not sure that all the signatures are signed. You know, at
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    some point, when we have the stuff, we can look at it and we
    can make a determination. But we don't want to create delay
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    while this is going on. We think it's useful to the process to
    create some deadlines so that we can actually see the things.
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    I mean, I'm not suggesting the debtor's not proceeding in good
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    faith. But the debtor's also been proceeding and talking to
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    us --
             THE COURT: I don't understand -- Mr. Princi says he
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    filed a motion; you filed objections to it. You've got
    objections to the motion. But he says we've already filed the
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    motion long ago.
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             MR. SIEGEL: Well, but that's actually what I'm going
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    to suggest. If the debtor doesn't believe that our objection
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    is well taken, that they haven't properly brought this issue
    before the Court, let's schedule a date on that objection. I'm
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    a little worried that may create some delay because if we are
    successful and you order him to file a motion, that's going to
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    create a delay. But --
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             THE COURT: I'm not ordering anybody to file a motion.
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             MR. SIEGEL: No, no.
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             THE COURT: He says he filed a motion. If I have to
    rule on it, I'll rule on it.
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             MR. SIEGEL: Understood.
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             THE COURT: But --
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MR. SIEGEL: But if Your Honor were to find that our 1 2 objection was well taken, you would find that they had not met 3 the requirements to assume and assign the contracts. And 4 therefore --5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. SIEGEL: -- the debtor would have to do something. 7 THE COURT: Any other points that you have on the schedule? Mr. Princi -- he says they did file a motion; you 8 say they didn't file a motion. 9 10 MR. SIEGEL: No. I understand. And --THE COURT: He objects in paragraph 3 to the August 11 12 20th date. He says it ought to be August 14th. 13 MR. SIEGEL: I think that's not a big deal between the 14th and the 20th. We can work that out. 14 15 THE COURT: Let me see whether anybody else wants to 16 be heard. Mr. Garrity? 17 MR. GARRITY: Good morning, Your Honor. Jim Garrity from Morgan Lewis on behalf of Deutsche Bank. I have one 18 19 question. And I just -- I don't know if I heard it correctly. I think when Mr. Princi was talking to you about paragraph 2, 20 21 he said, well, everybody knows what we're going to do because 22 in July we announced to the Court that we're going to assume --23 some of the debtors are going to assume and some are going to 24 reject. And we're going to file a motion in August to do that. 25 I thought that's what he said. I don't know. But if that's

the case, Your Honor, then we really don't have procedures and your point is well taken that we need to sit down and work through them. But it just strikes me that there isn't a motion on the calendar now to deal with that. And I may have misheard him. I may have misunderstood. And that was my only point.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Garrity.

MS. BOELTER (TELEPHONICALLY): Your Honor?

THE COURT: Let me get people in the courtroom first and then I'll make sure than anybody on the phone has a chance to speak.

MR. WEITNAUER: Your Honor, may it please the Court.

I'm Kit Weitnauer from Alston & Bird. I represent Wells Fargo
in two capacities, if you will. One is as a trustee. And
you've already heard from Mr. Siegel about our concerns there.

But Wells Fargo also has another role in this case,
Your Honor, as master servicer. And as master servicer, we
filed a partial joinder to the submission of the RMBS trustees.
Now it's a partial joinder because Wells Fargo, as master
servicer, is dealing with a completely different set of trust.
They are not part of the set of trust. They're part of the
9019 settlement. They are not debtor-sponsored. Their trust
with the debtor is one of the servicers or is the servicer.
And these trusts, as we understand it, these servicing
agreements with the debtor as servicer, are part of what was to
be assumed and assigned as part of the sale.

Now the total of this other set of trust is approximately 385. Okay. So in that context for those trusts, Wells Fargo, as master servicer, doesn't have any role on the put-back claims that may exist in those trusts. And I don't know if there are or are not any valid put-back claims in those trusts. But if there are, they're not part of the 9019.

But what's our role? As master servicer, Your Honor, our role is sort of big picture. Every month, when the servicer hands us the money, they collect it from the mortgagees and the amounts that are required to be advanced, we then take that and hand it to the institutional investors in accordance with the waterfall. We're also obligated to supervise the servicer's performance. And if there's a default to the extent provided in the documents, take action about that. So we care, in our role as master servicer, about existing defaults and any assurance of adequate -- adequate assurance of future performance.

Your Honor, we believe that the sales motion makes clear that there will not be any future performance that could possibly be adequate because Nationstar is not assuming an obligation relating to the pre-closing period. And we don't think that works in the context of a long-term agreement that has continuing obligations. And it's not just indemnity. It's all sorts of obligations.

THE COURT: Let me just -- that really doesn't bear on

1	what I'm dealing with today. I mean, you've got you may
2	have a valid objection.
3	MR. WEITNAUER: Right.
4	THE COURT: But it's not to the schedule.
5	MR. WEITNAUER: Well, we submit that it might be
6	important to the sales process, Your Honor, because if this is
7	resolved that Wells Fargo is right then I think Nationstar
8	would say, well, the condition to our purchase is not satisfied
9	because all we were going to pick up was stuff on and after.
10	And so, we think it's appropriate that this issue be resolved
11	before the auction.
12	THE COURT: Oh, it isn't going to get resolved today.
13	MR. WEITNAUER: I know that.
14	THE COURT: And what I'm dealing and with all due
15	respect, what I'm trying to deal with right now is what the
16	schedule you've acknowledged you're not part of the 9019.
17	MR. WEITNAUER: Not for those purposes, that's
18	correct.
19	THE COURT: And
20	MR. WEITNAUER: That's just a claim allowance issue,
21	Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Okay. And you've got arguments you want
23	to make. They'll be objections to the sale.
24	MR. WEITNAUER: Yes.
25	THE COURT: And when I get to the sale hearing, I'll

1 take them up.

MR. WEITNAUER: If that's how the Court wants to, that will be fine, Your Honor. We think it would be better to have it clarified in advance but we'll do what the Court says.

THE COURT: I'll decide the motions that are pending before me on the calendar today and that's not one of them.

MR. WEITNAUER: That's fine.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WOFFORD: Your Honor, good morning, for the record, Keith Wofford from the firm of Ropes & Gray on behalf of the RMBS institutional investors.

Your Honor, the good news is that on behalf of our fourteen billion dollars nearly in certificate holders and the concurring four billion represented by Mr. Franklin, your remarks today have presaged most of what I was going to say today. And the problem with respect to scheduling here is not that the debtors have come with Schedule A and the committee of trustees have come with Schedule B, but in fact the trustees as you noted came with a schedule that is not a proposed schedule at all. What effectively the schedule being proposed by the committee and the trustees would do, Your Honor, is to take away the proposed 9019 in its entirety without the opportunity of the debtor or our clients to get a day in court for the proposed 9019 as filed already.

This framework we believe is not permitted. The

debtors have the right to go forward with a motion. And, frankly, with respect to the notion of getting in the room again to try this after several weeks, I'm a little concerned Your Honor. We spoke with the committee a number of times in person and by the phone and, frankly, look, we've had the opportunity to come with a schedule and they wouldn't come with one. I think with respect to the pre-sale items, perhaps, there is some more for discussion but I think with respect to the fundamental gravamen of the 9019 which is the size of the claim and whether the trustees agree to accept that, we do need to try to set a schedule today.

I'm not optimistic --

THE COURT: The schedule isn't going to get set today because what is happening today is I'm ordering that counsel meet and confer beginning tomorrow morning and go day to day until we have a schedule. So I'm not going to pick and choose or throw darts as to a schedule. The constructs that each have taken so far diverge. We're not going to put off the 9019 until after some future negotiation between the trustees and the debtor. That isn't to say that they can't come -- the parties can't come to an agreed schedule about it. I'm certainly mindful of the comments you make, Mr. Wofford, with respect to -- be careful what you ask for because the 9019 may get heard. I'll hear evidence and the result may be it gets rejected and some additional negotiation and a schedule that

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tries to accommodate the specific needs of the trustees could avoid that happening.

MR. WOFFORD: You are right that that could happen,
Your Honor, but one other thing that could happen as you are
certainly well aware is that the process of setting a calendar
date, of being able to ascertain and delineate the actual
objections that are on the record and having the parties have
the opportunity before hearing to resolve those objections, we
would suggest might have the same effect on a quicker timeline.

THE COURT: Well, we're going -- whatever schedule is agreed to or that I have to resolve because the parties can't will -- needs to include specific dates for objections, hearings, discovery, et cetera. We're not going to come back in mid-November and talk about a new scheduling order. So this needs to be a comprehensive schedule that includes whatever matters -- either the motion, the 9019 that's been filed or that the trustees intend to file. I didn't press Mr. Siegel about what the trustees want to do to see if this Court can resolve issues that could take five years in the state court to resolve. That's not the issue for today. But an important issue from the trustee's standpoint, important issue for the investors and for the debtor and the committee. I mean it's obviously important in being able to put a schedule together that would have hearings, that would give parties a chance to try and resolve these issues if they can, but at the end of the

process, we'll give everybody certainty and people can fell -can do what they want but at least we'll provide all of these
moving parts some certainty about what the outcome is.

So I hear what you're saying but if you need to be a part of the scheduling, the face-to-face meeting on scheduling, that's fine, go ahead and do it but starting tomorrow morning.

MR. WOFFORD: Your Honor, that we take that into account but with one question because one thing that we need is not just a start point but an end point. Because even though the last conference --

THE COURT: The schedule is going to include start and end.

MR. WOFFORD: But I mean in terms of actually arriving with a schedule. Because one concern that we have, Your Honor, is that one of the arguments that will be made if a schedule is not agreed to is that as time continues to lapse, there isn't X time remaining before a sale.

THE COURT: I don't allow things to linger. So the schedule will be set -- I'm just not satisfied that the parties are meeting face-to-face tried to resolve those issues themselves. And that's what needs to happen.

MR. WOFFORD: Okay. Your Honor, certainly with -- in conjunction with the debtors and the committee, we'd love to hear any thoughts on alternative dates to set that new schedule because we are concerned.

THE COURT: You're not going to do it here -- we're not going to do it in court now. Okay?

MR. WOFFORD: Okay.

THE COURT: Anybody else?

MS. BOELTER: Jessica Boelter of Sidley Austin on behalf of Nationstar Mortgage, Your Honor.

I raise -- I rise for a very limited purpose and that is simply to point something out with respect to paragraph 4 of the proposed order by the UCC and the RMBS trustees. It's my understanding of the papers that were filed by the UCC and the trustees that they were intending to bifurcate issues that a potential purchaser of the assets would care about to the preauction period and let issues that perhaps only the debtor and their estates would care about to the post-sale period.

And if you look at paragraph 4 of their proposed order it says, "Except as to the pre-auction objections, all objections and cure claims of the RMBS trustees in connection with the sale motion are reserved notwithstanding the entry of any order entered in connection with the sale motion."

Now, the pre-auction objections that define term as I understand it is principally limited to issues like severing, the RMBS inventory, the enforceability of various origination provisions, but there are, of course, a lot of other objections that the RMBS trustees could assert to the sale. And the assignment of contracts to Nationstar or any other purchaser

such as adequate assurance of future performance whether the bid was the highest and best, good faith of the purchaser. And from our perspective and my guess is Your Honor doesn't want to hear about those things --

THE COURT: Look, highest and best is going to get resolved in a sale hearing.

MS. BOELTER: Right.

THE COURT: I mean that -- but this would be the rare case where the cure objections aren't deferred until after the sale and you get your chance if you're -- if Nationstar is a successful bidder for the servicing platform, it will no doubt negotiate with those who have cure objections to see whether they can resolve them. And if they can't, it has to be a hearing to resolve the cure objections, there will. And at some point Nationstar will just say nope, we're going to reject that. I'm not going to take that. I don't want to assume that contract. That's what always happens. Why is this different?

MS. BOELTER: Again, in this case, Your Honor, the only thing that concerns me is they're saying all objections to the sale that are asserted by the RMBS trustees shall be reserved notwithstanding the entry of an order approving a sale. And so, there are certain things that we think have to be resolved at the sale hearing.

THE COURT: I think you make a good point. It's part of the problem I have with this order in general that I don't

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read the tea leaves well and I'm not sure what -- I don't want to find out three months from now that somebody had some different intention about it. So when the parties meet and confer and try to resolve it, clarity, I think is the most important point. MS. BOELTER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Boelter. Anybody else wish to be heard? MR. SHORE: Good morning, Your Honor. Chris Shore from White & Case on behalf of the junior secured notes. They're holding a 900 million dollars in claims now with liens on substantially all of the debtors' assets. I'm also focusing on paragraph 4, the language at the end which I don't think works and I'm happy to talk to people about the language. we can't have this order resolved in priority issues in connection with the scheduling of sale objections. So on the record I'd add that if and to the extent anybody wants to put in the scheduling order something that addresses priority issues that they loop me in and we'll talk to them about it and if we can resolve any objections we will and if not we'll come back and address it when the scheduling orders up. THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Shore. Anybody else wish to be heard? Anybody on the phone? Mr. Princi?

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MR. PRINCI: First of all, Your Honor, I look forward

to hopefully resolving this. We should be able to resolve this. There's no reason why we shouldn't come to an agreement.

THE COURT: Would you like everybody to meet in your office starting tomorrow morning?

MR. PRINCI: 10 o'clock.

THE COURT: Okay. Beginning 10 o'clock at the Morrison & Foerster officer, those who wish to be heard with respect to the scheduling order.

MR. PRINCI: Please.

THE COURT: Talk to Mr. Princi after that's when -- when we start. I'm serious about this. We go day to day until you finish it.

MR. PRINCI: I'm --

THE COURT: And you can't -- what I want to get is I want to get one -- I can understand you may not be able to resolve all the issues but you ought to be able to agree on at least a format and what the format -- and maybe you think that paragraph 4(c) should say this and the trustees think that 4(c) should say that nd indicate what those positions are. And then, if it comes to that, I'll permit letter briefs that just address indifferences. And I'm not going to put a page limit on long or short. Okay. Just simultaneously file -- and work it out. The faster this gets resolved the better it gets resolved.

So try and iron out a common schedule. If you intend

to disagree, flag those issues. Short letter briefs addressing those. Mr. Shore's point about a scheduling order is a scheduling order. You can't resolve issues about priority. You can't -- it shouldn't have some very vague position that all objections -- there are certain objections that really do a sale process to be effective on. The buyers need to know what they're bidding on. So if there are objections -- many objections frequently don't get resolved until after a sale.

Adequate assurance, until you know who the successful bidder is, how do you ever know whether there was adequate assurance?

(Pause)

THE COURT: I'm going to set the scheduling conference for Tuesday, August 7th at 9 a.m. So by 5 p.m. Wednesday, August 1st I want to propose a scheduling order reflected to -- and hopefully you'll all agree. To the extent you don't I show the competing paragraphs and I want that same deadline for letters that just address the issues that are in dispute. I don't need lengthy arguments about why.

MR. PRINCI: Your Honor, may I ask the Court to reconsider those dates for the following reasons? I think you had it right earlier when you said go in a room, go day to day, get it done. I mean, Judge, I just don't believe that there is any reason why we should not be able to get a schedule completed by going tomorrow in the same room, Thursday in the

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same room. What I'm concerned about, Judge, if you give people
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    to August 1 it's going to be -- it's going, if you will, serve
    to -- we have a greater incentive, Judge. I think if you stay
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    with your earlier direction than providing August 1 and then,
    providing a date where there's a scheduling conference.
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             THE COURT: Well, I'm on an airplane then, July 31st.
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    And --
             MR. PRINCI: So why don't we get it done by the 30th,
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    Judge?
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             THE COURT: Well, believe or not, I actually have
    other things on my calendar.
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             MR. PRINCI: Sorry about that.
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             Would it be possible, Judge, that we set an earlier --
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             THE COURT: Stop. Stop.
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             MR. PRINCI: It's okay.
             THE COURT: Okay. I will address the scheduling.
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             I want to schedule an order by this Friday at noon,
    July 27th at noon. I want letters addressing all the
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    differences by Sunday the 29th at noon. And we'll have a
    conference on Monday, July 30th, 3 o'clock. I'm on an airplane
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    the next morning.
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             MR. PRINCI: Your Honor, thank you very much for your
    consideration and for moving your calendar like that. We
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    appreciate it.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lee, what are we going -- what
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1	do we have to cover today and then we'll decide how we're going
2	to deal with it?
3	MR. LEE: Give me one second.
4	Your Honor, the next thing on the agenda would be the
5	long delayed promise that Mr. Eckstein and I have made to the
6	Court to actually explain what's at issue in relation to the
7	subservicing motion. I would hope that we'll be able to
8	address that fairly quickly.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. LEE: Thereafter, Your Honor, we have a reduced
11	number of contested stay relief motions and then a few
12	professional applications which I think we should be able to
13	address fairly quickly as well.
14	THE COURT: All right. Here's I need a short
15	break. Let's take a ten minute recess and I'll come back in.
16	Okay?
17	MR. LEE: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Everybody can remain seated when I come
19	back in.
20	(Recess from 11:56 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.)
21	THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the record in
22	Residential Capital No. 12-12020. Mr. Lee?
23	MR. LEE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Gary Lee from
24	Morrison & Foerster for the debtors.
25	The next item on the agenda is the status conference

on the debtors' motion for a final order approving the servicing agreement between GMAC Mortgage and its nondebtor affiliate Ally Bank. That's the agreement under which the debtors provide subservicing for, I think, about 690,000 of Ally Bank's loans.

Your Honor, before I provide a report on the outstanding issues and the debtors', the committee's and AFI's efforts to resolve them, I'd like to put this motion into context as Mr. Eckstein and I both suggested we would need to do when we were last here.

As Your Honor is aware, the debtors are seeking to complete the sale of a mortgage servicing business, an origination business in bankruptcy. And as I think we've said from the outset, the success of that endeavor depends in large measure on the continued support and cooperation of the various governmental entities that are parties-in-interest in this case. And that support is contingent, really, on one thing which is the continued performance by the debtors of their obligations under the DOJ/AG settlement and the consent toward it issued by the Fed.

And the servicing agreement, Your Honor, in our view and I think the committee shares this view, it's a major component of the means by which the debtors are complying with the DOJ/AG settlement. It is, in fact, Your Honor, the vehicle by which the debtors are able to comply with the soft dollar

component of the settlement and creditor compliance and also is part of parcel of the way in which the debtors are meeting the hard servicing standards that they're required to comply with.

It is also, Your Honor, one of an integrated series of agreements between the debtors on the one hand, AFI and Ally Bank on the other which allow us to continue service loans and to originate new loans during the bankruptcy. And I think when I -- we've made this point before, Your Honor, those agreements and the support that Ally is providing are a significant driver of value in relation to the asset sale and indeed they're significant driver of the income ResCap generates during this case. Without the ability to originate that Ally Bank provides to us, it would be a significant loss of income to ResCap during this case in the order of tens of millions of dollars.

So as I mentioned earlier this morning, Your Honor,
AFI is doing what it committed to do at least under those
agreements and under the DIP and that was why, Your Honor, I
mentioned that we had committed to file a plan in the coming
weeks, in fact, in August so that we would at least comply with
some of the milestones in this case.

Now, turning to the servicing agreement specifically, the committee has raised concerns regarding indemnification payments paid by the debtors to Ally Bank pursuant to the servicing agreement.

Our understanding of the committee's view is that AFI

should have made these payments to the bank as opposed to the debtors. And one point, and this needs to be very clear for the record, absolutely everybody agrees the bank should be paid. The payments are due and owing. What was paid should have been paid. And in our view, the payments that we've made to date post-petition which are just under twenty million dollars, were required by not just the servicing agreement but they are part and parcel of the cost of complying with the DOG/AG settlement.

Now, in addition to a difference of use with the committee on payments made to date, there's also a difference of opinion as between the debtors, the committee, AFI and the bank as to the obligation to make future payments.

We have argued to AFI and the bank that the requirement to make further payments under the servicing agreement is capped once the debtors have obtained 200 million dollars in soft dollar credits under the DOJ/AG settlement.

And because of the very efficient way in which the debtors went about modifying Ally Bank's book, we believe that that threshold has, in fact, been met and we have argued to AFI that we believe that further payments are its obligation. AFI disagrees with us as does the bank. And in that regard, last Thursday we received a letter from the bank advising us that the failure to make payments that are now due and owing of about five million dollars are an event of default under the

agreement. So the issue is very bright now.

Because of the significance of this agreement, we've been working very hard to bridge the gap between the parties and bring about a resolution of these issues. And I think that's demonstrated by the fact, Your Honor, that we have one disagreement with the committee and another disagreement with AFI and the bank. We are trying to bridge the difference very hard. And everybody understands that these issues really need to be resolved in order to conduct an orderly sale.

So as a result of those negotiations, we have tentatively agreed to terms that were spelled out in the supplemental declaration that was filed by the CEO of ResCap, Mr. Marano, and I believe that was filed last Monday.

Now, we believe that the proposed compromise is reasonable particularly in light of the importance of the agreement. And particularly in light of the potential consequences that might arise if ResCap lost the ability to service the Ally Bank loan portfolio. Now, I want to caution that nobody has made a threat that that will happen but clearly the bank which is regulated by the FDIC has whatever rights it has.

And Mr. Marano described, I think in some clear detail what the potential consequences are if the servicing agreement is not approved. And I believe, and we've had this discussion several times with the committee, they agree that approval of

the servicing agreement is critical. Where the dispute lies, Your Honor, is in relation to the compromise and the indemnification payments. So at the end of the day, everybody understands that what we need to have is an approved servicing agreement. The dispute is over the indemnity. So we will continue to work with the committee, AFI and the bank to address their concerns.

Your Honor, if our efforts are unsuccessful to bring everybody to agreement and the hearing on the servicing motion proceeds on a contested basis, we will argue, Your Honor, that performance under the servicing agreement on the terms that Mr. Marano spelled out in his declaration, and that's assuming that AFI agrees to those terms because they are tentative, is a reasonable exercise of the debtors' business judgment are necessary to ensure the asset sale remains on track.

The committee served us with informal discovery on July the 6th. We provided them with documents both before July the 6th. We're providing them with documents after July the 6th and there really is no issue in terms of the speed with which discovery is ongoing. And depositions, we understand, will need to be taken.

As for witnesses, the key witness if there's an evidentiary hearing will be Mr. Marano, Mr. Detweiler who's the head of the subservicing operation --

THE COURT: This would come up as a 9019? How -- in

what warm or fashion would it be presented to the Court?

MR. LEE: I believe, Your Honor, the way that it's

contemplated, and as I said, the resolution as between ResCap and AFI is a tentative and be recent is that it would be subject to an appropriate modification of the terms of the servicing agreement. So fundamentally, the servicing agreement in a term X (ph.) requires ResCap to make certain indemnification provisions. And there is a dispute between us and AFI as to how those indemnification provisions work and between the committee. So the simplest form, I think, rather than in terms of a settlement to see --

THE COURT: Is this a 363 motion? Is it --

MR. LEE: Well, it's a motion to assume the servicing agreements. That theoretically one could just simply modify the terms of the agreement on terms that the parties agree. Or alternatively, Your Honor, might simply rule that the terms of the agreement are X, Y and Z and the indemnification --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand how this is going to come before me if you don't resolve it.

MR. LEE: It'll come before Your Honor in an evidentiary hearing on the terms of the servicing agreement and what the servicing agreement and the other related agreements require in terms of indemnification.

THE COURT: The reason I keep asking in the context is because obviously a different standard may apply depending in

what form it comes before the Court. There's a pending motion 1 2 to approve the subservicing agreement. Now, you're talking about amending or modifying the agreement. Do I understand 3 4 that correctly? 5 MR. LEE: Modifying --6 THE COURT: There's an existing agreement. 7 MR. LEE: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And assuming the debtor reaches an agreement, at least, with AFI and the bank and contemplate an amendment to the existing servicing agreement.

MR. LEE: That is my view, Your Honor, but I haven't had that discussion with AFI. As I said, AFI's position is that the agreement that was reached with the -- between ResCap and AFI is tentative subject to documentation and my contemplation is that the easiest way to do that is by an amendment to the servicing agreement to spell out in the servicing agreement which is the agreement between Ally Bank and ResCap precisely where the indemnification obligations lie.

Ally Bank is not a party to the DOJ settlement agreement. So, therefore, what our position is it should be irrelevant to the bank who pays it as long as somebody pays it and there is a difference of view as to who has the obligation. Our view is that the compromise that's been proposed is an acceptable one from a business perspective.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEE: So I think, Your Honor, we will work with the committee and with AFI to try to narrow the issues in the event that evidentiary hearing is required. I think, Your Honor, we had spoken at the last hearing with some dates. I think Your Honor had suggested August the 14th. I might be misremembering.

THE COURT: I have a very full ResCap calendar for August 14th. I don't know what -- there's a lot of stay relief the motions which are all important. It fills most of the page on my computer screen just looking at the list of matters on the calendar. I'm not saying that this shouldn't be heard on that day.

MR. LEE: The reason why I think Your Honor will recall why we wanted to have it heard in August was because if the agreement's not approved then the existing agreement by its terms effectively expires. And the FDIC required Ally Bank to effectively put the agreement out for bid. And we, obviously, ultimately ended up having the right to continue to subservice the book.

What we don't want to do, Your Honor, is be in a situation in which the agreement has expired by its terms which is in effect what will happen.

THE COURT: You need to remind me again because I really am drawing a blank. Was there an agreed schedule for discovery, briefing, filings assuming hearing in AU --

contested hearing on August 14th or not? I'm drawing a complete blank.

MR. LEE: Your Honor, it has been the subject of discussion between ourselves and the committee but we haven't submitted anything to the Court. And again, I think what we --what Your Honor asks us to do at the last hearing was to report back. We would then hear from Your Honor whether or not there had been a couple -- there'd been a suggestion of an earlier date in August but Your Honor had said that really isn't going to work. I think I want to do this on August the 14th. Come back and tell me whether or not you've reached a resolution. If you haven't, I'll set it for August the 14th and then once you've done that, we will submit an order -- a scheduling order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Eckstein, you want to --

MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, good morning. Kenneth Eckstein of Kramer Levin.

THE COURT: We made it into the afternoon.

MR. ECKSTEIN: I made it into the afternoon. I did notice.

Your Honor, before --

THE COURT: All on scheduling it seems.

MR. ECKSTEIN: All on scheduling, yes.

Before plunging into discovery schedules, I think it would be useful to try to put this motion into context. I know

we've actually adjourned this motion on several occasions now 1 2 in an attempt to see whether or not this matter could be resolved and I will assure Your Honor that last week was 3 4 occupied by almost an entire week of in-person meetings. Tuesday, a full committee met with senior management from 5 6 ResCap about this subject among others. On Wednesday, 7 representatives of the committee met with the senior executives of Ally Bank. And on Thursday, representatives of the 8 committee met with senior executives of AFI. And so, there was 9 10 extensive in-person discussions and a time between the adjourned hearing a week ago Thursday and today I thought was 11 12 put to extremely useful use in terms of the parties making 13 very, very serious in-person efforts to try to reach an 14 agreement. 15 I think it's -- I guess it's probably apparent to Your 16 Honor that we're not announcing an agreement today. I'd like 17 to just put it into context briefly if I may and then we can 18 talk about maybe what the most sensible way is to proceed. 19 THE COURT: As I understand it, since the petition date the debtors have paid twenty million dollars in 20 21 indemnification payments?

MR. ECKSTEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.

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ResCap or GMAC Mortgage has been providing subservicing to the Ally Bank mortgage portfolio going back to 2001. And the terms of that arrangement, at least pre-petition

had been supplemented by a swap arrangement that provided some compensation to ResCap in connection with the servicing and that swap would be terminated prior to the commencement of the case. ResCap, AFI and Ally Bank all felt that it made sense to continue the servicing during the bankruptcy case so that the platform essentially could be maintained in the ordinary course while the platform was being sold. And toward that end, they agreed to apparently proceed with an amended servicing agreement.

Mr. Lee mentioned Ally Bank in an attempt to ensure that there was an arm's length relationship between Ally Bank and ResCap, insisted that before entering into an amended agreement that the terms of an agreement be put out for bid to third parties. And apparently, the -- an RFP was put together. It was given out to -- we're told twelve potential servicing entities. Six parties came back with proposals. There were three contracts and ultimately the ResCap proposal was -- was accepted. And we're told that ResCap was viewed as a good servicer. And there were 700,000 mortgages and sort of made business sense that if ResCap was doing a good job servicing and as long as we had market terms in order to deal with the servicing for the next several months until a sale got concluded that it makes sense for everybody; ResCap and AFI and Ally Bank to maintain the status quo.

And we understand that a contract was entered into on

May 11th, three days before the bankruptcy for an amended servicing arrangement and that was the subject of a motion that was filed on the first day of the case and Judge Peck heard a presentation with respect to the amended servicing motion and the Court was told that it was business as usual and the terms of the amended servicing arrangement were laid out in the motion. They were three pages single spaced laying out the services and the compensation and the events of default and the termination and it looked like a servicing motion. And we were told that it was on market terms. And that was what we knew. And it was approved. And it was set down for a final hearing on June 18th.

The motion did not make any reference, Your Honor, to indemnity payments and that was troubling to us and it is troubling to us right now. And as Your Honor pointed out that, in fact, as a result of the motion, following the entry of the interim order, 19.9 million dollars was paid by ResCap in respect of an indemnity obligation that ResCap and AFI jointly had entered into with Ally Bank in January of 2012 with respect to the DOJ attorney general settlement. It's a complicated settlement. They're complicated obligation. But when it's boiled down to its essence, there was an agreement between AFI, ResCap and Ally Bank that provided for reimbursement payments and releases of debt and extensions of credit and a whole series of undertakings that were not part of the servicing. It

was a separate standalone agreement that was entered into prepetition where you had joint obligations by ResCap and AFI to
reimburse Ally Bank. And there's discussions about whether it
was capped at 200 million dollars or not although what we now
understand is that everybody seems to agree that number one,
ResCap is in full compliance with the DOJ settlement, which is
important. And number two, that, in fact, as of the petition
date, ResCap had satisfied between cash payments and soft
credits the 200 million dollar obligation that it was obligated
to pay under the DOJ settlement.

Now, if this motion was simply about whether or not the terms of the servicing that were amended and built into the motion were appropriate and whether it made business sense for ResCap to continue to service Ally Bank's loan between now and the closing of a sale, I don't think we would have had three adjournments. I don't think we would have a lot of discussion. It makes business sense. We understand that. And while I can't represent to Your Honor that we know for certain that it's on market terms, we're told that if there was an RFP and there was bidding and that ResCap's proposal is within the range of market terms and that seems to make a lot of sense. And the committee is supportive of the servicing continuing between now and the closing. We all agree on that. We have a problem.

THE COURT: Did the RFP cover require

indemnification --

MR. ECKSTEIN: We don't -- I don't believe so, Your Honor, no. I don't believe the indemnification has anything to do with servicing.

What happened was that the servicing was used as a vehicle to fold in the pre-petition indemnification arrangements that existed between ResCap, AFI and Ally Bank and that is the nub of the problem.

Pre-petition in March or April of 2012, ResCap paid forty-eight million dollars in respect of this indemnity.

Post-petition, ResCap has paid 19.9 million dollars in respect of this pre-petition indemnification. As Your Honor heard, there's a five million dollar bill that is outstanding for June. And, in fact, since it is still outstanding last week, AFI -- Ally Bank delivered a notice of default under this amended servicing agreement on the ground that they are entitled to be reimbursed for the -- essentially the costs of the modification.

THE COURT: If the indemnification obligation didn't exist pre-petition in the servicing agreement, where did it arise from?

MR. ECKSTEIN: It arose from a June -- January 30 letter agreement entered into between ResCap and AFI and Ally Bank. And they were pre-existing indemnity agreements that ran between AFI and Ally Bank in connection with servicing but the

indemnity with respect to the -- with respect to the DOJ payments arose out of a January 30th, letter.

By rights, if it was appropriate and it made sense to assume the January 30th, letter, a motion could be made to assume the January 30th letter and there'd be a hearing on whether or not we should assume the January 30 letter and on what terms. And that's -- part of the problem is that motion is not pending. Instead, it was folded into the servicing agreement and essentially as a toll for the privilege of it continuing to service on market terms, we essentially have learned that what is necessary is that ResCap has to pay what looks like it could be in excess of hundred million dollars of cash to Ally Bank and it could be more if there are further modifications essentially as a toll for having the privilege of continuing to do what they've been doing in the ordinary course of business now on market terms.

THE COURT: Did the January 30 letter tie it into any other agreements between the parties?

MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, I wouldn't even pretend to try to answer that with certainty. But it was a standalone agreement. It was related to the DOJ settlement. I'm not aware that it didn't tie into anything else that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

But now in the amended servicing agreement, the amended servicing agreement references -- references the DOJ

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settlement and it essentially says that ResCap has to pay all essentially costs of modification.

Now, as an aside, it's interesting from a business standpoint, what are the modifications really mean? Basically, you have a pool of mortgages that Ally Bank originated. mortgages have problems and they're not worth their face, necessarily. ResCap goes ahead and modifies the mortgages usually by writing down the face or changing the terms. And so, essentially a mortgage with a one hundred dollar face is modified down to seventy dollars, let's say. And so, what does it mean? What does the indemnity mean? It means that ResCap goes out and modifies the mortgage. It goes from a hundred to seventy which is probably fair market value for the mortgage. The mortgage is actually cleaned up and improved and then ResCap has to turn around and write a check to Ally Bank for thirty cash dollars on an administrative basis to reimburse Ally Bank which is owned by AFI, of course, for the difference between what the face amount of the mortgage was and what the real fair market value is.

Whether that makes business sense or not, Your Honor, I don't know. And that's not something that I want to deal with today and I don't think anybody wants to deal with that today but that was the agreement that was reached.

And the fact that AFI is jointly obligated to pay those indemnities is interesting and important and is something

that we, frankly, think should be dealt with in connection with a plan. That's a pre --

THE COURT: I understand -- curiosity is the January

30th letter or the amended loan servicing agreement is subject

of the examiner's investigation?

MR. ECKSTEIN: I have no doubt the examiner will look closely at the January 30 letter and will look at all the negotiations surrounding the January 30 letter and the payments that were made prior to. The January letter -- the January 30 letter was a fascinating letter because it contemplated the bankruptcy file, it contemplates DIP financing, and it contemplates an entire sequence of events that are now playing out and it was contemplated very carefully at least as far back as January and I'm sure before January.

But again, it's -- the problem we have, and I'm going to be honest, the problem that we have is we've tried to resolve this because we agree it is a good thing for ResCap and we think for AFI to maintain the status quo and for ResCap to continue to service 700,000 mortgages that are currently part of their servicing platform between now and the closing. And it's a one year contract and there's no guarantee that AFI and Ally Bank will continue to stay with the purchaser but it essentially gives the purchaser and AFI post-closing the ability to decide --

THE COURT: What happens to the indemnification

1 obligation post-sale?

MR. ECKSTEIN: Post-sale, ResCap no longer has a new liability. And AFI is obligated independently on the indemnity and AFI and Ally Bank I'm sure we'll figure out a way to work that out.

THE COURT: So what discovery have you taken to date?

MR. ECKSTEIN: Look, Your Honor, the problem is we have --

THE COURT: August 14th is going to be here before you know it.

MR. ECKSTEIN: Correct. Everything is here before we know it.

And we have -- as Mr. Lee indicated, we served the debtor with document requests. We had asked for e-mails and the debtor has not yet provided e-mails. We provided them search terms and I take from Mr. Lee's comment that they will find a way to provide us with the e-mails as to the facts surrounding all these events. There are a lot of facts.

THE COURT: What's your discovery cutoff date?

MR. ECKSTEIN: We have not yet taken depositions, Your Honor, because we held off. If we're going to have a--

THE COURT: What should be the discovery cutoff?

Because I -- what's going to happen, August 14th is really just around the corner and as you know from this and other matters if I have to have a contested evidentiary hearing, I'm going to

have everything well in advance of that hearing, direct 1 2 testimony, written narrative form, deposition designations, counter designations, exhibits, objections, the full package, I 3 4 generally want it a week before, August 7th, okay. That's 5 really close. So I care most about that August 7th date and 6 everything else to that point is what's going to make all of 7 your lives miserable. But you can't wait much longer to have -- whether you call it a contingency plan in mind that, 8 okay, here's the schedule. I don't -- what I don't want to 9 10 hear come August 7th well, we need to move that date another four days because we're continuing to discuss and maybe we'll 11 12 have an agreement and then, I don't have the stuff, and I don't 13 feel I'm prepared for a contested hearing; and that's what I 14 insist on doing. 15 So what you all need to do is by Thursday, I want an 16 agreed order on a schedule. Is your view that it needs to go 17 forward on August 14th? 18 MR. ECKSTEIN: No, Your Honor. I mean the problem -there are two problems and I'm not belittling AFI's issues but 19 AFI has a deadline in the DIP and AFI feels as if they keep 20 21 pushing the deadline out and they don't like to push the

THE COURT: Well, you've known about the deadline, though.

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deadline out.

MR. ECKSTEIN: But we can't -- it's not in my control,

Your Honor. So I'm dealing with --

THE COURT: It is. It's in your control to say we don't agree; we're going forward with a contested hearing.

Yes?

MR. ECKSTEIN: That's what we're prepared to do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ECKSTEIN: So -- but I don't need to go forward.

I'm saying we're going forward because that's the deadline.

The other deadline is there's a five million dollar bill out there which Ally Bank wants to be paid. We agree Ally Bank should be paid and there's an issue whether it should be paid by ResCap or AFI and that -- that right now is not resolved and that's putting some pressure right now on the issue.

Your Honor, we'll be prepared to go forward on August

14th and we'll finish the -- we'll submit our papers --

THE COURT: No, you're prepared to submit -- that both sides will submit declarations for direct expected -- for the direct testimony. Declarants will be present in court for cross-examination. If you're going to submit any deposition designations and counter-designations I want those by August 7th as well. I want briefs of each side by August 7th. And I'm going to leave it in the first instance to you and Mr. Lee to work out what dates you need to agree on to get to those dates.

1	I hope you settle it. If you can't, we'll have to go
2	forward. I understand that.
3	MR. ECKSTEIN: If I may suggest, Your Honor, rather
4	than burden Your Honor with the calendar right this moment, let
5	me and Mr. Lee or our colleagues try to work out a schedule
6	over the next two days and come back to Your Honor with the
7	schedule for how we would complete discovery and submit the
8	unnecessary materials contemplating an August 14th hearing.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.
10	MR. ECKSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Let's be before you sit down, let's
12	we have a call on Thursday at 2 o'clock, a telephone call, just
13	to see where you are on the schedule.
14	MR. ECKSTEIN: On
15	THE COURT: This Thursday.
16	MR. ECKSTEIN: on this issue?
17	THE COURT: On this issue.
18	MR. ECKSTEIN: Thursday at 2?
19	THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ECKSTEIN: That's fine. That -- we can do that.

I think we can -- by then, we'll be -- we'll have worked out the schedule.

THE COURT: Just let my -- one of my law clerks know a call-in number.

MR. ECKSTEIN: That's fine.

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1	THE COURT: Hold on. What do we have then?
2	(Off the record)
3	THE COURT: 1 o'clock.
4	MR. ECKSTEIN: Thursday at 1?
5	THE COURT: Thursday at 1. I have a 2 o'clock.
6	MR. ECKSTEIN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Okay? Thank you.
8	Now, Mr. Lee, really briefly. And then, I got to
9	figure out what we have left because I want to take a lunch
10	break.
11	MR. LEE: Your Honor, just a couple of things by way
12	of clarification.
13	First of all, the I think Mr counsel to the
14	committee suggested that we've actually satisfied the
15	requirement to obtain 200 million dollars in borrower relief
16	credits as of the petition date. That is, in fact, incorrect.
17	We hadn't well, no, but that's
18	THE COURT: I don't want to get into the merits of it.
19	I just it is either you did or you didn't and
20	MR. LEE: But it just for there's a declaration
21	that sets out from Mr. Marano the time and I just don't want
22	the record or the transcript to
23	THE COURT: You don't agree to.
24	MR. LEE: thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: All right. What is it that we need to

1 cover. I'm trying to --

MR. CORDARO: Your Honor, may I be heard on this just briefly?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. CORDARO: Thank you, Your Honor. Joseph Cordaro, Assistant United States Attorney appearing on behalf of the United States of America. And I just want to briefly point out an issue of concern that the United States has with the Marano declaration and we're still reviewing it. It's rather complex and there are a lot of complex exhibits to it.

But the solicitation and modification aspects of the DOJ/AG settlement, of course, are a key component of the borrower relief that's contemplated in that settlement. And there was a statement in the Marano affidavit to the effect that solicitations on the Ally book have been suspended I assume pending these negotiations. It was in paragraph 18 of that declaration.

THE COURT: I haven't read the declaration.

MR. CORDARO: Okay. And again, there's a lot of complex things going on here so we're reviewing it and, of course, the government's position is regardless of whether that 200,000 dollar cap --

THE COURT: I think it's 200 million --

MR. CORDARO: -- 200 million dollars -- excuse me -- cap has been met, the solicitations under the DOJ/AG settlement

should continue as -- and the modifications. They're bonded 1 2 together. And to the extent there's any question about that, I would encourage all parties to contact the government and 3 4 discuss that with us as soon as possible. And, of course, to 5 the extent that there is disagreement over that, of course, we 6 reserve our rights to object or take any other appropriate 7 action. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Cordaro. 8 9 MR. CORDARO: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 MR. SCHROCK: Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, come on. 11

MR. SCHROCK: Ray Schrock of Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of Ally Financial and Ally Bank. I think Your Honor, in reading your body language we'll be very brief.

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I think suffice to say we do have a disagreement with the committee on behalf of the Ally Bank who is a counterparty to this agreement as well as AFI. We tried to work it out. We'll be happy to speak to them. I don't have a great deal of faith that it's going to get worked out but I think procedurally what you have in front of you is an amended -- it's effectively an amendment to the subservicing agreement and it can just be dealt with in the final order.

We disagree with the way the committee framed up the issues for purposes of whether or not this agreement should be approved. I think fundamentally it's an agreement between Ally

Bank on the one hand and ResCap on the other. And the question is whether or not the debtors' business judgment should be respected.

I don't think that a lot of these other issues come into play but to the extent they do, we'll deal with them. But I think it makes the hearing unnecessarily complex.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schrock.

MR. SCHROCK: Um-hum.

THE COURT: All right. I'm looking at this long agenda. We still have quite a few matters to cover. We're going to take a lunch break. Before we do, on the agenda on page 4 was the ResCap, the Allstate Insurance Co adversary proceeding which -- actually, this was on the motion to dismiss. I had the trial on the preliminary injunction and it went forward only as to one of the defendants in the case and I ruled from the bench. I'm still waiting for proposed orders. There was the stipulation that was entered into before the hearing that resolved the motion stated until October 31 as to the vast bulk of the defendants.

At the time of the hearing, there was an adjournment after the plaintiff put on his case and there was announced on the record a resolution with the FDIC. I still haven't seen an order about that. I received an e-mail from Judge Swain today who has the FDIC matter. She was -- I had advised her of what had occurred at the preliminary injunction hearing and I told

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her I would forward her the order after it was submitted and
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    entered. I'm still waiting.
             There also was to be an order as to the one -- I don't
 3
    remember whether -- but there were three parties that would be
 4
    covered by orders or one, but I haven't seen any of them yet.
 5
    Mr. Lee?
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 7
             MR. LEE: We'll go back to your office -- I'm sorry,
    Gary Lee from Morrison & Forester -- we'll go back to the
 8
 9
    office as soon as we're done, Your Honor, and make sure that's
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    done.
11
             THE COURT: Are they done?
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             MR. LEE: I will check at the break.
13
             THE COURT: I really need to -- we need to get that
14
    buttoned down.
15
             MR. LEE: I will force the issue internally.
             THE COURT: Okay. All right. So we're at the
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17
    portion, if I understand it, there's some uncontested matters.
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those. I gather the debtor has some proposed stipulations it wants to present. Do I understand that correctly?

MR. KLEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Aaron Klein

from Morrison & Forester on behalf of the debtors.

I don't know whether anybody wants to be heard with respect to

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Yes. With respect to the Shellpoint motion to lift the stay and also the Community South Bank motion to lift the stay, we have prepared stipulations and orders. We are

1	prepared to submit the Shellpoint stipulation to today. And
2	I'm told that we will be sending you a stipulation regarding
3	Community South Bank, a consent order on that one later today
4	or tomorrow morning. But those two have been resolved. We're
5	pleased to report that.
6	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
7	And there were also listed in the uncontested matters
8	the retention application for Towers Watson Delaware. Mr.
9	Marinuzzi, there have been no objections filed to that as I
10	understand.
11	MR. MARINUZZI: That's correct, Your Honor. No
12	objection was filed to that application in lieu of us
13	THE COURT: Mr. Masumoto?
14	MR. MASUMOTO: I believe I have a supplemental
15	declaration was filed and that's satisfied
16	THE COURT: And you're satisfied. Anybody else wish
17	to be heard with respect to the Towers Watson application?
18	All right. It's approved.
19	MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. We also filed
20	an application to retain Fortace LLC as debtors' consultant in
21	connection with the RMBS litigation.
22	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Masumoto?
23	MR. MASUMOTO: Similarly, we had discussions and I
24	believe a supplemental was filed which resolved those
25	objections.

1 THE COURT: Anybody else wish to be heard on that? 2 It's approved. MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, and then, the final 3 4 retention application was to uncontested matters is the debtors' application to retain Severson & Werson a special 5 6 California litigation counsel. We filed supplemental 7 disclosures to address the issues. THE COURT: Mr. Masumoto? 8 9 MR. MASUMOTO: No issues. 10 THE COURT: Anybody else wish to be heard with respect to the Severson & Werson PC retention application? All right. 11 12 That's approved as well. 13 Are we going to take -- we'll get to the contested 14 matters --15 MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt you but we skipped over the debtors' application to extend the time 16 17 to file schedules and statements and it's not opposed and we 18 filed them. 19 THE COURT: Anybody wish to be heard with respect to the application to extend time on schedules? All right. It's 20 21 granted. 22 MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Let me -- does the 23 24 agenda remain accurate as to those contested matters; Gilbert,

Wells Fargo, Centerview and there were a few others. All

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right. We're going to be in recess until 2 o'clock. We're
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    into the one hour recess and then we'll try to knock it off.
 3
    Okay?
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             MR. MARINUZZI: Okay, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
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             MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you.
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         (Recess from 12:57 p.m. until 2:06 p.m.)
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
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             MR. MARINUZZI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Marinuzzi?
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             MR. MARINUZZI: For the record, Lorenzo Marinuzzi,
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    Morrison & Foerster on behalf of the debtors. Your Honor, if
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    it's okay with the Court, we'd like to proceed out of order a
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    little bit on the contested matters and deal with the retention
    issues, because they're not really contested for the most part.
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             THE COURT: That's fine.
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             MR. MARINUZZI: And I'd like to begin with item 4,
    which is the debtors' application to retain Centerview as
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    investment banker. Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee filed an
    objection to the motion which had originally been filed back in
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    June, and we continued the hearing to the 14th -- to today --
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    I'm sorry 24th. And we believe that the issues raised by the
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    U.S. Trustee, which were really in the nature of disclosure,
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    have been addressed with the supplemental declaration of Marc
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Puntus in support of the application.

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And basically, Your Honor, to highlight the economic terms of Centerview's retention: Centerview's being retained and has been retained to raise financing as well as oversee and administer the sale process. Their compensation post-petition calls for a monthly fee of 300,000 dollars, a transaction fee of 12.5 million dollars, half of which was paid upon the execution of the asset purchase agreement. The other half would be due and earned at closing. But as an accommodation to the committee, Centerview's agreed that that second half will not be paid until the effective date of a plan of reorganization.

There's also a financing fee of up to five million dollars which has been paid, and an interim transaction fee of 1.25 million dollars, which has already been paid as well. There's crediting that's set forth in the engagement letter. Crediting includes fifty percent of all monthlies against any transaction fees -- fifty percent of monthlies earned postpetition. And there's also a crediting against the transaction fee of fifty percent of all financing fees earned over 500,000 dollars.

Your Honor, we believe that the terms of their retention are market. And unless the Court has any questions or anyone else wishes to be heard on it, we would ask that the Court approve the debtors' retention of Centerview.

THE COURT: Mr. Masumoto?

1	MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, subject to a review of the
2	final order, we believe the incorporated change in the final
3	order that addresses our concerns but I believe they have a
4	final change that needs to be circulated.
5	MR. MARINUZZI: Correct, Your Honor. The final change
6	is the change I just mentioned about not being paid the second
7	half of the transaction fee until the effective date of a plan.
8	THE COURT: Does anybody else wish to be heard with
9	respect to the Centerview retention application? Mr. Eckstein?
10	MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, Kenneth Eckstein from
11	Kramer Levin on behalf of the committee.
12	Your Honor, we did review the application carefully.
13	We reviewed comparable retention applications for investment
14	bankers in large, complex cases. I think we concur with the
15	fact that this is market. Or to the extent there's a market,
16	this is somewhere in the market. We did ask all of the
17	financial professionals to make the modification that
18	Centerview has agreed to, which is that completion fees be paid
19	only upon the effective date of a plan. And that was agreed
20	to.
21	And in an effort not to contest all matters that are
22	raised in the case, the committee, with that modification, did
23	not have an objection to the application.
24	THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody else wish to be heard?
25	All right. The Centerview application is approved

subject to the U.S. Trustee and the Court having an opportunity to review the final order.

MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. That brings us to the debtors' application to retain FTI Consulting as financial advisor.

Your Honor, the United States Trustee had also objected to this application. And in response to that, FTI has filed additional disclosures, which we believe address the U.S. Trustee's concerns. This application was originally filed seeking approval of compensation that's a little bit different from what is ultimately being proposed. And that's a result of modifications requested by the committee, after extensive discussions.

And whereas originally FTI was to receive a monthly fee of 1.75 million dollars through the end of March, and a 4.3 million dollar completion fee, payable upon the earlier of the closing of a sale transaction, or confirmation of a plan, the compensation's been modified as set forth in, I believe, Exhibit 2 to the supplemental declaration of William Nolan.

And just to summarize the economics, Your Honor.

There is now -- it's an hourly engagement, subject to a cap.

And to the extent that FTI exceeds for that given month

whatever that cap is, it carries forward. And it carries

forward through April, and thereafter there's no longer the

ability to roll forward any overage.

so in looking at the numbers and reconciling what made sense -- and let me back up a second. Part of the reason why the company and FTI had agreed to an arrangement that held a steady state was in part for cash flow purposes, to manage what the professional expenses would be. And so revisiting those numbers with the committee, FTI and the company and the committee have agreed that for the period from the inception of the case through June 30th, the cap applicable to that period would be 4 million dollars. And then for the period July through December of this year, the cap would be 1.75 million dollars. And then beginning in January and running through the end of March, for those three months, the cap would be 1.25 million dollars. And then thereafter, the cap would be 1 million dollars. And the completion fee, which had originally been 4.3 million dollars, is now 2.5 million dollars.

Your Honor, I believe that satisfies the committee's concerns. The U.S. Trustee's concerns, I believe, as I noted, were addressed in the supplemental declaration. We'll certainly show a copy of the order to both the U.S. Trustee and the committee before we present it to the Court. But unless Your Honor has any questions --

THE COURT: I do. My question really relates to FTI's work for the Chapter 7 trustee of Alliance Bank Corp., and how -- because they are -- the Chapter 7 trustee, as I understand it, is involved with an adversary proceeding against

the debtors. And how is the Alliance Bank Corp. potential conflict matter being handled?

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I know there was some disclosure on this in Mr. Nolan's supplemental declaration, and possibly in the original application, because we had wanted to make sure that it was addressed by the court. We were satisfied that it didn't present a conflict, just based on the nature of the proceedings and that there had been a wall between those that had provided services for the Chapter 7 trustee and those providing services in this case.

I'm trying to find the portion of the declaration that's relevant to this point. And Mr. Nolan, by the way, Your Honor, is here in court with us, and would be happy to address the Court's concern, if I fail to do it adequately.

Your Honor, in paragraph 7 of Mr. Nolan's initial declaration he describes the claims associated with that Chapter 7 case. And as he notes, the Chapter 7 trustee of Alliance Bank Corp. is currently involved in an adversary proceeding with Residential Funding Corporation for recovery of pre-petition transfers. FTI has agreed to work cooperatively with the parties-in-interest to share files and work product. But that engagement was essentially completed in 2010. So it predates, significantly, the commencement of this case.

From time to time they've been asked to provide and interpret certain accounting information from Alliance Bank

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Corp.'s books and records. But the FTI professionals involved
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    in the Alliance Bank Corp. engagement have not been asked to
    provide any services on this matter since March of 2012.
 3
             THE COURT: Are those people going to be screened from
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 5
    ResCap?
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             MR. MARINUZZI: They will be, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. Mr. Masumoto?
             MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, we have no further
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                 They did also include a modification to the order
 9
    objections.
10
    which addressed further concerns that we had.
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             THE COURT: All right. Does anybody else wish to be
12
    heard with respect to the FTI retention? Mr. Eckstein?
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             MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, just very briefly. Mr.
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    Marinuzzi has accurately captured the economic modifications to
    the FTI arrangement. And in contrast to the Centerview
15
    retention, where it's a relatively small monthly and a large
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17
    back-end, this one had a large monthly. And so the notion of
18
    building in a cap we thought was actually quite meaningful.
19
    Because it's very difficult to project out into the future what
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    would be an appropriate cap. So the fact that there are now
21
    going to be hourly rates with a cap, we thought was actually a
22
    financial advantage to the estate.
             FTI did agree to reduce the completion fee. But we
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    thought that the cap provided meaningful consideration, so to
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speak, for the completion fee. I just wanted to point out that

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the order now provides that the monthlies will be subject to
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    Section 330. So if it turns out that the scope should change,
    one way or the other, we'll all be able to go back and, I
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 4
    think, talk to FTI. And I think that that was understood, that
    we'll be able to look at where the case is. And the completion
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    fee, we understand, is a 328 order.
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 7
             THE COURT: Thank you.
             MR. ECKSTEIN: So with that, we're satisfied, Your
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 9
    Honor.
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             THE COURT: Anybody else wish to be heard?
             All right. The FTI retention application is approved.
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             MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, that's it as far as the
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13
    debtors' applications respecting professionals. I'll turn it
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    over to Mr. Eckstein to address the committee's application to
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    retain Moelis.
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             MR. ECKSTEIN: If we can just have a second, Your
17
    Honor?
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             THE COURT: Sure.
         (Pause)
19
             MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, the creditors' committee
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    has engaged Moelis as an investment bank in the case. We've
22
    also retained AlixPartners as a financial advisor. The
    AlixPartners application is being adjourned to, I believe, the
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    August 8th hearing, because there are still open issues in
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    connection with disclosure that the U.S. Trustee is looking at.
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And I think Alix agreed yesterday that it was going to file a supplemental. So we're going to go forward just with the Moelis retention today.

The Moelis retention application, from an economic standpoint, they have a monthly fee of 225,000 dollars per month. And they have a completion fee, Your Honor, of 7.75 million dollars, which will be payable in the same manner as the Centerview and FTI completion fees, upon the effective date of a plan. They don't have any interim payments of a completion fee, so it's all paid at the end of the case.

And again, we did look at comparable retentions for financial advisors for committees in large, complex cases. And there was a fair amount of back-and-forth between the committee and Moelis to ultimately arrive at the terms of this retention. And we believe that the retention is reasonable and consistent with what is approved in cases for similar complexity and size in terms of transactions and amount of debt.

I think there are two issues that are still open with the U.S. Trustee. One, I believe, relates to the identity of certain passive minority investors in Moelis itself. And I believe counsel for Moelis is in court and can speak to that issue. But my understanding is that the identity has been disclosed to the U.S. Trustee.

THE COURT: I saw it was going to be disclosed in confidence to the U.S. Trustee, the committee, and the debtor.

MR. ECKSTEIN: And we felt that that was satisfactory. These are under one percent minority passive investors. And we don't think it has a relation to the case. They were on the debtors' list, which is why it was flagged. But we thought that those disclosures were appropriate.

The other issue, we understand, relates to reimbursement of Moelis for outside legal fees in connection with the retention application and the preparation of fee applications. I was in court when this was discussed most recently. And I am advocating some type of policy be adopted by the investment banks. But until that happens, the issue is still open. And so I'll let the U.S. Trustee address that issue.

THE COURT: Mr. Masumoto?

The investment bank policy is to ask for everything.

MR. MASUMOTO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian
Masumoto for the Office of the United States Trustee. Your
Honor, as Mr. Eckstein indicated, we have pretty much narrowed
down the issues. There is sort of a half issue that we had
discussed yesterday with Moelis, in which we had asked them to
expand the search for conflicts beyond the restructuring group
to include partners and the level down from partners, to
determine if there were any conflicts.

But with respect to the other two remaining issues, I believe they were accurately represented by Mr. Eckstein. With

respect to the confidential parties, it's the position of the U.S. Trustee, while we certainly welcome the disclosure to our office, to the committee, and to the debtors, we believe that, in fact, the disclosure is most effective if it's done so that other parties-in-interest who may, in fact, be affected by the disclosure, can weigh in.

So it is our preference that any of the confidential affiliates that are listed be identified. I believe we had tried to maintain that same policy with Alix, because they also had certain confidential parties-in-interest. And I believe, based upon the supplement that I've seen, is that they appear to be complying. Once again --

THE COURT: When you say "complying", what do you mean?

MR. MASUMOTO: Complying, they've identified the confidential parties that the original declaration did not formerly disclose. But we will defer to the Court as to whether or not the disclosure just to the committee, the U.S. Trustee, and the debtors is sufficient with respect to Moelis' circumstance.

With respect to the remaining issue, once again, it is an issue that has been reviewed by the Court several times and became an issue -- was raised as an issue and discussed during the July 13th, I believe, hearing. At that time -- just to try to get to the heart of it -- I believe at that time Your Honor

did indicate that the decision in Borders was a decision rendered at the time where the fee applications had been considered, where the expenses that --

THE COURT: The objection hadn't been asserted at the time of the retention application.

MR. MASUMOTO: That's correct, Your Honor. And that in this case, we are asserting it at the outset. And in addition, one other difference from the Borders decision involving Mercer is that the Mercer professional in the Borders case, as well as in this case, is an hourly -- is a professional billing on an hourly basis.

Moelis, in this case, as indicated by counsel, is billing on a fixed-fee basis. As indicated, they're billing at a monthly rate of 225,000 dollars, with a back-end of 7.75 million dollars. I believe at a minimum, should a restructuring transaction occur within the nine-month period, their minimum compensation will be 9,775,000 dollars.

And basically -- and frankly, from the perspective of the program, financial advisors are well-compensated. Based upon their compensation structure, frequently, at the end of the day, taking into account their fixed-fee compensation as well as their back-end fee, they're frequently the most highly compensated professionals in these cases.

As a result, it is the position of the program that the attorneys' fees should, in fact, be a cost of doing

business. I believe Your Honor mentioned in the Borders decision, perhaps in a slightly different context, that in many cases the cost of doing business -- certain of the costs should be borne by the applicant. And in this case, where we have a fixed-fee professional who is well-compensated, the cost of the outside attorneys could well be borne by these professionals, who routinely appear in bankruptcy and should have the wherewithal and certainly the capability of: 1) being able to prepare and submit a retention application; and 2) the fee applications that are filed.

I do note, and I do understand, Your Honor mentioned the Mesa case in the Borders case in regard to the level of the fees that would be charged for a fee application process. And in those cases, a three to five percent fee might have been -- would be appropriate or might have been appropriate under the circumstances.

THE COURT: That was the -- what I mentioned -- I think, because I haven't gone back to look at it -- but that was trying to establish a range of compensable fees in connection with preparation of a fee application.

MR. MASUMOTO: That's exactly right, Your Honor. And in fact, I think it was made clear, both in the Mesa case as well as in Borders, that that percentage may not necessarily apply to every fee application. Certainly, if one were to apply that rate the present compensation, even at the minimum,

nine million dollars, the amount charged for a fee application would be quite substantial. I believe even at the three percent rate, we're talking almost 300,000 --

THE COURT: I can't imagine applying that structure in a case such as this, with an engagement involving the dollars that this does.

MR. MASUMOTO: Agreed, Your Honor. And so therefore, from our perspective, the cost of preparing the fee applications, in this case, which would probably represent the larger part of the compensation, my understanding is that, based upon the supplemental that was filed by Moelis, the parties having reviewed the transcript of the prior hearing, have really narrowed the amount they'll be charging for the preparation of the retention application.

THE COURT: What is that?

MR. MASUMOTO: I believe we were advised that it's in the range of 2,000 dollars. That may be adjusted further. And that's really relatively de minimis. So we're really talking about the fee application in this case. And given the amounts involved, certainly at the outset, and again, the size of their compensation, we do believe that, in fact, the fee application preparation, as well as the retention should be borne by the applicant.

THE COURT: The difference, Mr. Masumoto, is -- I mean, the rules about whether preparation of fee applications

are compensable was a rule, at least as I saw it, that was derived outside of this context of professional advisors. The cases support a law firm charging for preparation of its fee application. The time it spends preparing a fee application is compensable. That was, as I understood it, the law when I wrote the Borders decision.

And I think the rationale is, if it's compensable for a law firm to charge for the preparation of its own fee application, shouldn't it be compensable for professional advisors who are not lawyers to do the same. That given the rules that are applicable to fee applications, it, for better or worse, has become a task that is largely overseen or reviewed by lawyers.

So if a law firm can do it, why shouldn't Moelis be able to do it? I view that, actually, as different than the fees in connection with retention, which I think is a stronger argument that is overhead.

MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, part of the concern that our office has is that, once again, we do have the distinction between any hourly compensated professional with a fixed-fee professional. And from our perspective, we regard that in the aggregate. The hourly compensated professional is entitled to charge for fee application preparation --

THE COURT: It's going to cost a lot less for the periodic applications of a fixed-fee professional, because they

don't have to provide quite the same level of detail that the hourly professional does.

MR. MASUMOTO: And from our perspective, that's perhaps another argument that, in fact, it should be an expense absorbed by the estate (sic). Once again, when looking at the aggregate, the professionals, even if you include the time that they would spend, or even the cost of preparing the fee application, their compensation, in general, seems to far exceed any of the hourly compensated professionals.

THE COURT: But I want to be sure. Your -- the third piece of this that usually comes up is indemnification, if they're deposed, and they have counsel. You're not objecting to that?

MR. MASUMOTO: No, Your Honor. We've always taken the position that the costs associated with attorneys' fees for indemnification purposes are permissible, pursuant to the agreement that we've struck with the investment and financial advisors.

THE COURT: Okay. Is it really only 2,000 dollars in fees in connection with retention?

MR. RIELA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Riela from Latham & Watkins on behalf of Mo --

THE COURT: Speak quickly so we don't run the time up anymore.

MR. RIELA: I was just about to say, I'm going to be

very brief given the topic at hand here. With respect to the application itself, since Moelis gets retained in a lot of Chapter 11 cases, they have their forms done very well, and I don't have to spend too much time doing it. More of the fees that I've incurred to date have been basically dealing with the objections.

So if we're talking about all retention-related fees, like prosecuting the retention in connection with the objections, it's going to be a bit more than 2,000 dollars. I would say offhand, that perhaps in connection with doing the retention application, reviewing the affidavit and all of that, probably in the neighborhood of 3- to 4,000 dollars, more in connection with dealing with this objection, with respect to that question. And I'm happy to address other issues.

THE COURT: You know, the thing is, in -- I can't remember the name -- Judge Bernstein's opinion -- was it CCT, he doesn't make a blanket statement, but he basically comes out that the general rule is you don't get paid for defending your fee application. If there's a challenge to the fee application, for example, you don't get paid for defending that. If objections are raised to retention of a professional because not sufficient information has been disclosed about conflicts, that's really inherent in -- if you want to get hired, you disclose the information that the U.S. Trustee insists, or you put the issue to the Court and let the Court

1 decide in the end.

Anybody else wish to be heard with respect to these remaining issues on reimbursement of outside counsel fees?

MR. RIELA: If I could be just heard for one second, Your Honor, again, staying very brief here. Just to raise a couple of concerns that were raised by Mr. Masumoto as well as by this Court. I did read the transcript from the last hearing with respect to Mercer, and the supplemental declaration was drafted to deal with the issues that Your Honor raised during that time, in what's done outside of bankruptcy, what's done in bankruptcy cases, what is Moelis' standard here.

And Moelis does retain outside counsel in Chapter 11 cases. The engagement letters in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases always provide for payment of outside counsel fees. To the extent that those counsel fees are actually incurred, they're typically paid -- they're typically paid in bankruptcy as well. We're not going to be seeking any fees in connection with negotiating or drafting the engagement letter. That was only a couple thousand dollars on that end --

THE COURT: Press the button on the computer, and it spits it out.

MR. RIELA: Exactly. To a large extent, yes, particularly, these days, with good form engagement letters.

The only point that I want to address is Mr.

Masumoto's point about investment bankers being very highly

paid in cases --

THE COURT: Are you denying that?

MR. RIELA: I'm not denying. However, on the other hand, though, I see a lot of Chapter 11 cases where lawyers get quite a bit more than the investment bankers, and usually the lawyers do get paid for their work in both retention and fee application preparation matters.

THE COURT: So am I supposed to have sympathy for the investment bankers because sometimes lawyers earn more?

MR. RIELA: Maybe a little. I don't know. I'm kidding, Your Honor. Unless Your Honor has any questions about the supplemental declaration, Jared Dermont is here in the courtroom. Also, if you have any questions about the confidentiality issue with respect to the few passive investors, that is confidential information. Moelis is a private company. And again, we did provide those names on a confidential basis to both the debtors and --

THE COURT: What's the largest percentage ownership of any of the confidential investors?

MR. RIELA: They're all less than one percent.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. You know, this issue of lawyers' fees as expense reimbursement has come before me now in a number of different cases. I wrote the Borders opinion. In Borders the issue arose at the time of the fee application. At the time of the retention the U.S. Trustee had a general

reservation of rights, but did not explicitly raise this issue of reimbursement of professionals. The opinion says what it says, and I continue to adhere to it.

I did say in the opinion that the issues could well be different if the objection were raised at the outset, and it has been here.

I'm reluctant to adopt bright-line rules applicable in all cases, and I don't intend to write another opinion at this point on what's reimbursable and what is not. I'm persuaded by Mr. Masumoto's argument about the distinction between professionals compensated on an hourly basis and the fixed-fee professionals, such as Moelis, particularly with the upside that it has with completion fees, et cetera.

Again, I'm not intending to establish a rule for all cases in all circumstances. But having reviewed this matter and considered the objection of the U.S. Trustee, I'm going to sustain the U.S. Trustee objection in part and overrule it in part. With respect to the retention issues, I'm going to sustain the objection. I do believe, particularly, since given the size of this proposed engagement, that the very modest amount of fees in connection with retention should be considered part of overhead, whether Moelis seeks to include such provisions in all of its engagement letters or not. So as to that portion of it, the objection is sustained.

With respect to reimbursement of outside counsel fees

1	in connection with preparation of fee applications, for the
2	reasons I articulated earlier, I think the law is reasonably
3	well-settled, certainly in this district, that the counsel
4	fees, when counsel prepares their own fee applications, the
5	time included and the cost for preparing fee applications is
6	compensable, subject to a very careful scrutiny by the Court.
7	And I think a similar rule should apply, whether it's Moelis or
8	AlixPartners or Mercer; whether it's an hourly fee professional
9	or a fixed-fee professional.
10	The obligation to do fee applications is one imposed
11	by the Bankruptcy Code. For better or worse, the strictures in
12	the U.S. Trustee guidelines and in applicable case law is such
13	that lawyers' time is generally required in connection with
14	preparing fee applications.
15	I think Mr. Masumoto addressed what I said in Mesa,
16	which had discussed not, again, a rule applicable in all cases,
17	but I discussed I think Ms. Frejka, you were the one who, if
18	I'm not mistaken, didn't you argue that in
19	MS. FREJKA: No, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: No?
21	MS. FREJKA: That is the one that they didn't have
22	counsel for. They did it themselves.
23	THE COURT: All right. Okay. That the three to five
24	percent was a general guideline range, barring other

circumstances, might be applicable, circumstances such as the

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very large size of the expected engagement fee in this case.

So one shouldn't think that that applies. But as I do in all cases of fee applications, the applications are scrutinized carefully. With respect to expense reimbursement for counsel fees, I expect detailed time records to be provided, and they'll be scrutinized carefully. But subject to that, I'm going to overrule, Mr. Masumoto, the U.S. Trustee's objection with respect to whether fees in connection with preparation of fee applications are compensable.

Mr. Masumoto, are there other issues with respect Moelis that remain, or --

MR. MASUMOTO: No, Your Honor. I believe a supplemental disclosure regarding -- outside their restructuring group is all that we required.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MASUMOTO: And the disclosure of the confidential --

THE COURT: Yes. With respect to the disclosure of the confidential investors, again, I'm not intending -- because I know that my colleagues and I from time to time see transcripts of our hearings showing up in future cases. I want to make clear that in ruling on this issue now, I am not intending to adopt a bright-line rule applicable in all circumstances, or even for all professional advisors in this case.

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I will accept counsel's representation -- I have not
 1
    looked at this confidential list of investors -- but I accept
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    the representation as accurate -- the list has been provided to
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 4
    the U.S. Trustee and to the debtor and committee counsel --
    that none of the investors holds more than one percent. On
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    that basis, I'm satisfied that submitting it in camera to those
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    parties who've received it, is sufficient here, and overrule
    the objection in this case, under these circumstances, beyond
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    that. But not intending to adopt a bright-line rule for all
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    cases.
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             Is that it, Mr. Masumoto?
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             MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor.
13
             THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
14
             MR. MASUMOTO: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right.
             MR. RIELA: Your Honor, is it acceptable for me to be
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17
    excused?
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             THE COURT: Yes, it is. Close the meter off.
19
             MR. RIELA: Excuse me?
             THE COURT: Close the meter off.
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21
             MR. RIELA: Close the meter off.
22
             MR. KLEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor; Aaron Klein
    from Morrison & Foerster on behalf of the debtors. We have two
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    contested motions to lift the automatic stay. I know that the
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    agenda reflects the first one as the Gilbert motion. With your
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permission, we'd like to move forward first with the motion
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    filed by Aurora Bank. But we need to confirm whether counsel
    for Aurora Bank is on the phone today.
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 4
             MR. LLOYD: Yes, Your Honor; James Lloyd representing
    Aurora Bank, from Green & Hall in California.
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 6
             THE COURT: All right, thank you.
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             MR. LLOYD: Thank you, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel. It's your motion, so
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    let me hear the motion to lift the stay from Aurora.
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             MR. LLOYD: Yes, Your Honor. Aurora FSB is a bank
    that was involved in servicing home mortgage loans. There are
11
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    four separate mortgage loans. They total about 1.4 million.
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    And as a result of transgressions by GMAC in wrongfully
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    reconveying, as part of --
             THE COURT: I think that's alleged transgressions, at
15
16
    this point.
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             MR. LLOYD: Alleged transgressions. Well, you know,
    you don't say -- you don't get it -- anyway. So the
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    reconveyances made Aurora unable to foreclose on these
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    properties, and therefore we've been damaged. In the process
21
    of getting the motion -- making the motion to lift the
22
    automatic stay, and also in responding to the opposition and
    objections by GMAC, the bottom line here really is, you know,
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    why would the Court want to lift the stay when it appears that
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we're just one of many.

And in reality, there are vagaries of California real estate law that -- for example, these are called trustees.

They're not mortgages. There's a little bit of a difference.

There are other issues associated with some of the complexities of California real estate law. And so it's better if these California real estate mortgage issues are litigated in California.

The witnesses are there. The --

THE COURT: You know, let me just stop you there. I don't hold myself out as the resident expert, but I practiced law in California for thirteen years, remain a member of the California bar, and I'm generally quite familiar with California real estate and mortgage law, so that part of your argument doesn't get much traction with me.

MR. LLOYD: Well, I was a member of the New York bar for a long time, still am, so I understand where you're coming from, Your Honor.

The other issue, then, would really -- what we're trying to do is, as what was done in the case of In re Joyner, is to allow us to proceed in state court so that we can obtain basically the monetary damages, and find out -- so that we can reduce these claims against the debtor to a judgment. And it allows us to determine exactly where Aurora Bank stands in this mess of litigation.

We've tried to mediate. We've tried to reduce the

cost and the burden to GMAC. I think we can still do that.

But in light of how we'd like to proceed, I think it's in the

best interests of the debtors, and it would certainly assist in

judicial economy to lift the stay to allow us to proceed so

that we can get a money judgment and then get back in line

where we need to be.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want to add?
All right, let me hear ResCap's counsel.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Aaron Klein, Morrison & Foerster, on behalf of the debtors.

Your Honor, our response is pretty straightforward and simple. Aurora has not met its burden to show cause to lift the fundamental protections afforded by the automatic stay to the debtors. This is a classic core matter dealing with the liquidation of pre-petition money damages claims against the debtors.

Let me take a step back. The actions underlying in California, Aurora is asserting claims against the debtors. They're trying to liquidate those claims. In one of those actions, what they've termed the joint action, which is really about three different properties, where they allege transgressions against the debtors for wrongful reconveyance of deeds of trust, in that action itself, we're the only defendants.

And so the idea here that they're trying to reduce

1	their claims so that they understand where they are with
2	relation to other unnamed parties, doesn't really make much
3	sense to me. This is not a complex matter, as Your Honor said,
4	that Aurora needs to litigate in a specialized forum. This
5	Court is more than capable of adjudicating the claims that
6	Aurora has against the debtors, and should, through the uniform
7	centralized process for claimants provided under the Bankruptcy
8	Code.
9	THE COURT: Is there a second case that does have
10	other defendants?
11	MR. KLEIN: Right now, there is another case called
12	the Rogers action, in which GMAC mortgage has actually launched
13	an action to determine whether or not a reconveyance or a
14	release of a lien was void on its face because they released
15	the wrong lien allegedly released the wrong lien. So there
16	are defendants in that case, but they're only as a counterclaim
17	asserted by Aurora against the debtors in that case.
18	THE COURT: So what's the status of your affirmative
19	case?
20	MR. KLEIN: The status of the affirmative case is
21	that

We're not -- we haven't moved forward with that. What we're

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stay as a sword and shield.

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THE COURT: Because you're not going to get to use the

MR. KLEIN: Well, we're not trying to, Your Honor.

trying to do in that case is to get a declaratory judgment that says whether our reconveyance was right or wrong. We're not seeking money damages in that case, so -
THE COURT: Yes, but why should you be -- are you

attempting to proceed with your declaratory judgment action,
and at the same time preventing Aurora from proceeding with its
counterclaim?

MR. KLEIN: Right now, my understanding is, we're not moving forward with that case. We're not moving forward with any of these cases, the Rogers case or any of the cases involved in the joint action. We did go to mediation in the Rogers case. That mediation was unsuccessful, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think --

MR. LLOYD: Your Honor, James Lloyd again. My understanding --

THE COURT: No, could you just hold on. I'll give you a chance after Mr. Klein is finished. Sure.

MR. LLOYD: Thank you. Sorry, Your Honor.

MR. KLEIN: Your Honor, I'm not going to take a long time here. I'll be brief. I think the simple fact, Your Honor, is that the claims that Aurora is bringing against us are garden-variety pre-petition claims that can be liquidated here in the bankruptcy court. The key point -- and I can address the Sonnax factors, and I'm very prepared to do so -- the key point is there's a simple resolution for Aurora. If

it's seeking money damages against the debtors solely, the remedy here is to file a proof of claim in this court and liquidate its damages.

If they're seeking to bring claims against third parties that they name in their reply: the current homeowners, the subsequent encumbrancers, the previous homeowners, all it has to do is to sever GMAC Mortgage and ETS, which are the debtor-defendants, from the California actions, and pursue whatever claims they may have against third parties in California state courts.

I'm very happy to walk this Court through -
THE COURT: You don't need to go through each of the
Sonnax factors.

MR. KLEIN: Okay. Well, let me just say that we think each of the factors does weigh in our favor of maintaining the automatic stay, and we don't think that Aurora has met its burden to even show good cause for why the stay should be lifted.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lloyd?

MR. LLOYD: Well, Judge, just in quick response to that, Your Honor. And one point is, my understanding is that in the Rogers action there's been no stay filed. So that still -- that technically has not as yet been stayed.

With respect to the other points, I, with respect to Mr. Klein, disagree with his assertions that we have not met

1	his burden we have not met our burden. I believe that we
2	have. And we're prepared to submit with after this
3	argument, we're also prepared to submit on the papers.
4	Also, as Your Honor may be aware, it's not just a core
5	matter of liquidation of claims. These are pivotal issues of
6	California law with respect to
7	THE COURT: That's what claims resolution usually
8	involves.
9	MR. LLOYD: Right.
10	THE COURT: Virtually everything we get are state law
11	claims against a debtor. And it's part of the claims
12	resolution process.
13	MR. LLOYD: Well, I understand that, Your Honor.
14	Severance is not going to work, because GMAC is pivotal to the
15	whole issue. There's likely to be other third parties
16	involved. Other than that, Your Honor, I believe we've said
17	what we need to say.
18	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Klein, let's come back to
19	the status of the Rogers action.
20	MR. KLEIN: Sure.
21	THE COURT: Mr. Lloyd said it's not stayed. And I
22	understand it's not. And the automatic stay doesn't apply to
23	an action commenced by the debtor. But what court is it in?

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MR. KLEIN: Right. And, Your Honor --

El Dorado County Superior Court?

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MR. LLOYD: Yes.

MR. KLEIN: -- if I can give you a little bit of color here. In that case, we had moved for a rescission, a declaratory judgment saying that a reconveyance or release of the first deed of trust which Aurora was servicing, was void. There was an intervening bankruptcy case, and the bankruptcy trustees sold the property free and clear. So the property is sold.

The Rogers action is not stayed. What's really -- the only operative thing happening in the Rogers action, from what I understanding, is that Aurora has filed a counterclaim in intervention against us, because the trustees of the bankruptcy borrowers sold the property free and clear.

Aurora has a secured claim in that bankruptcy, so they have -- I don't know if they've received funds, but they are entitled to a certain amount of funds. And the issue in that case and the issue in the other cases, the real factual issues are, what are the damages. Are the damages for the full face amount of the loan? In the Rogers action specifically, are the damages mitigated by the fact that they have a secured claim against the bankruptcy estate that sold the property. And in the other actions, what was the fair market value at the time that Aurora could have foreclosed.

So there's many issues here. But with respect to the Rogers action, that's the status of it. And really the only

operative thing that's happening --

THE COURT: Tell me what your intention is with respect to the declaratory relief claim that the debtors have asserted in the Rogers action.

MR. KLEIN: At this point, Your Honor, I think what we're -- this relates to another matter which is part of the joint action, Tozier. In Tozier there was a judgment that said we, the debtors, did have authority to reconvey the first lien deed of trust. And so what I think is pending in the Rogers claim now is waiting for a judgment to occur based upon kind of what happened in the Tozier matter. But from what I understand, Your Honor, we are not moving forward. There has been no stay put in the Rogers matter, but we're not moving forward, litigating the Rogers matter.

MR. LLOYD: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Lloyd.

MR. LLOYD: Jim Lloyd, again, if I may? My understanding, and with all deference to Mr. Klein, is that Aurora was determined not to be a secured claimant in the underlying bankruptcy action because of the conveyance of the property by GMAC. So we're not standing in line in that action as a secured creditor with a secured claim at all.

THE COURT: My most immediate concern and questions really relate to whether the debtor is intending to proceed -- here's where I'm confused now, Mr. Klein. It sounded like

you're waiting for the court to enter a judgment. On what?	Is
there a summary judgment motion? What is the precise	
procedural status?	
T generally, where	

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MR. KLEIN: I'm told that the Rogers matter --

THE COURT: Let me finish. I don't like when lawyers turn their back on me when I'm speaking, which is what you did.

MR. KLEIN: Pardon me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't like when lawyers seek to stay or prevent a counterclaim from being asserted in a case in which they're proceeding -- the debtor is proceeding with its own claim. That's why I'm trying to get a very clear answer about if I deny the motion to lift the stay, what is the debtors' intention with respect to its claim against Aurora?

MR. KLEIN: If you'd give me one moment, Your Honor, I can confer with --

THE COURT: Yes. When you ask to do that, I'm more than happy to allow you to go back and talk to your colleagues.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much. One minute.

Your Honor, after conferring with my colleagues, from what I understand, since the property was sold and we went to mediation and we agreed that there would be a standstill in that Rogers action, nothing has happened since that point. And from our perspective, the debtors' claim is stayed in that case. We're not moving forward with --

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1	THE COURT: Well, the automatic stay doesn't apply
2	MR. KLEIN: getting a judgment.
3	THE COURT: to a claim that did the state court
4	issue a stay?
5	MR. KLEIN: I think there was a sta
6	MR. LLOYD: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. Pardon
7	me for interrupting.
8	MR. KLEIN: There was a standstill agreement while we
9	went to mediation. The mediation failed. And after the
10	mediation, nothing has occurred. There has been no stay put in
11	place in the Rogers action.
12	THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take the matter
13	under submission, and an opinion or order will issue in due
14	course. If I deny I'll tell you this; I want to be
15	absolutely crystal clear about this. If I deny and I'm not
16	sure what I'm going to do yet but if I deny the motion to
17	lift the stay, I would expressly provide the debtor may not
18	proceed with its action without further leave of this court.
19	And if the state court in California you can
20	certainly appear if the state court schedules a conference. I
21	don't want to interfere with the superior court's scheduling,
22	because there's no formal stay in place, you need to come back

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MR. KLEIN: Understood, Your Honor. And I want to

and let me know, and I'll deal with it accordingly. But I

don't want the automatic stay used as a sword and a shield.

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make clear from the debtors that we do not intend to do that,
 1
 2
    and we don't intend to move forward with the Rogers action
    while at the same time defending against Aurora's claims
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 4
    against us in the joint action.
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             THE COURT: So tell me about the joint action. What
 6
    is the -- you've got claims asserted in there as well or not?
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             MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor. The claims --
 8
             THE COURT: You're just --
             MR. KLEIN: -- the claims --
 9
10
             THE COURT: -- the debtors are just defendants.
11
             MR. KLEIN: We're the defendants.
12
             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. KLEIN: Yes. And in the Rogers action, again,
    we're not asserting claims for money damages at all.
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             THE COURT: I understand what you're saying. You're
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    not asserting claims for money damages, just declaratory
17
    relief.
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             MR. KLEIN: Right.
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             THE COURT: Which can make -- I haven't seen the
    pleadings in the case. I don't really want to look at the
20
21
    pleadings at this point. I may ask to see them. But for now,
22
    I'm going to take the matter under submission. Thank you very
23
    much.
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             MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lloyd.
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MR. LLOYD: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 1 MR. KLEIN: Your Honor, the next matter is Gilbert's 2 motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case, or in the alternative, a 3 4 motion for relief from the automatic stay. 5 THE COURT: Right. 6 MR. KLEIN: I would cede the podium to counsel for 7 Gilbert. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 8 Why don't you just pull the microphone down a little 9 10 bit, make it easier for you. Thank you. 11 MS. PARKER-LOWE: Good afternoon. My name is Katherine Park-Lowe, and I represent Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert. And 12 13 we're seeking relief from the stay. Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert's case was -- first of all let me back up just a minute. 14 The Gilberts' home and the Gilberts' mortgage is not 15 property of the debtors' estate. That was established by the 16 17 North Carolina Court of Appeals more than a year ago. The Deutsche Bank and GMAC Mortgage, as servicer, failed to 18 19 establish that they had the right to proceed with the foreclosure. 20 21 In the course of the foreclosure action, the Gilberts

In the course of the foreclosure action, the Gilberts filed an equitable action in North Carolina which was removed by the defendants to the district court. From there, that case was dismissed. We appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit reinstated the entire case except

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for one money damages claim.

It is an important case for consumers, but also for bankers, because twelve days later, Bank of America tried to get into the case just after the debtors filed a petition for rehearing. Bank of America tried to get into this case telling the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that it did not know what it was doing.

And we're seeking relief from the stay so that the time period for the defendants to file a petition for cert can run, and so that this matter can go forward. Under the Sonnax factors, this will allow a full and complete resolution, because we have two parties who are outside of bankruptcy, and we have two parties who are inside of bankruptcy. This is -- and this is -- although there's not a special tribunal set up to handle a matter like this, this is a Truth in Lending claim, which is a highly technical area. The nonbankruptcy federal court is specifically set up to handle federal issues. And in the interests of justice and the efficiency of administration, I think we are entitled to proceed in the forum that the defendants, not debtors, chose. We did not choose this forum. But that's where we are and there's where we're headed.

THE COURT: This was an action -- the Gilberts brought an action against Deutsche Bank and Residential Funding LLC and GMAC Mortgage LLC. Is that correct?

MS. PARKER-LOWE: Correct.

THE COURT: The district court dismissed it. The 1 2 Fourth Circuit reversed. The Fourth Circuit -- I have the June 20th, 2012 order that denied the motion for rehearing --3 4 MS. PARKER-LOWE: Correct. THE COURT: -- and rehearing en banc. Ordered that 5 6 the mandate issue as to Deutsche Bank America's, David Simpson 7 as substitute trustee, but stay the mandate as to appellees Residential Funding LLC and GMAC Mortgage LLC, because of the 8 9 automatic stay. 10 MS. PARKER-LOWE: Correct. THE COURT: And so what is it that prevents you from 11 12 proceeding with your action against Deutsche Bank in the federal district court? The Court reversed -- the Fourth 13 Circuit reversed, denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, 14 issued its mandate. You could go back to the district court 15 16 and proceed with your case against Deutsche Bank. Who's filing 17 cert? 18 MS. PARKER-LOWE: The defendants have given all indication, although we don't know for sure, but they have 19 hired Sidley Austin and another group of lawyers, which would 20 21 be an indication that they intend to seek cert. 22 THE COURT: So let's say --23 MS. PARKER-LOWE: The matter that --24 THE COURT: -- they do. Let's --

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MS. PARKER-LOWE: Excuse --

25

THE COURT: -- let's say Deutsche Bank files a petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court either denies cert or grants cert, and hears; and let's assume that it ultimately hears it and affirms the Fourth Circuit. Okay? you're a little -- this case may well be over by then, because of the schedule that it's on. How does the stay impact what you're going to do? I mean, if -- the fact of the matter is, if the Supreme Court -- if Deutsche Bank files a petition for certiorari and the Supreme Court hears it, or more likely denies cert, it'll go back to the trial court and the case -no stay as to Deutsche Bank, and you can go ahead with your case. So how are you adversely impacted? If you think you have a claim against any of the debtors and you file a proof of claim against them and you go through the claims allowance process, the debtor may not be bound by what the Fourth Circuit did, but it sure may be pretty

19 process. So how are you hurt?

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MS. PARKER-LOWE: The folks in the clerk's office at the United States Supreme Court tell me that the clock is ticking as to the unstayed --

persuasive about what the outcome of -- in the claims allowance

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. PARKER-LOWE: -- parties.

THE COURT: Yes.

```
MS. PARKER-LOWE: They have an obligation to either
 1
 2
    file or not file. Assuming that they file, the folks in the
    clerk's office tell me that then the case will be stopped, hung
 3
 4
    up.
             THE COURT: Why is that?
 5
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: Until there is some ruling from this
 6
 7
    Court with respect to the two parties that are in bankruptcy.
             THE COURT: Well, if the ruling you're expecting is a
 8
    ruling on your motion to lift the stay, you'll have a ruling.
 9
10
    I'm not quite sure what it's going to be yet, but you'll have a
    ruling. I'm not familiar with -- is there something in the
11
12
    Supreme Court rules that would hang it up, as you used the
13
    term, where they have a petition for cert from nondebtors, as
14
    to which the matter's not stayed, they'll either timely file a
15
    petition or they won't?
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: They tell me they will not entertain
16
17
    the motion as to the unstayed parties until there is a ruling
18
    from this Court.
19
             THE COURT: Ruling on what?
20
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: On whether, at some point, these two
21
    parties are going to be released.
22
             THE COURT: Oh, you'll have a ruling. You'll have a
    ruling pretty quickly. That isn't going to hang anybody up.
23
24
    The ruling may be to deny your motion to lift the stay. I
25
    don't know yet. But that may be the ruling. Let's assume
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```
that's the ruling, what happens then?
 1
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: Then --
 2
             THE COURT: I deny your motion to lift the stay; what
 3
 4
    happens then? Deutsche Bank -- let's assume Deutsche Bank
    files a petition for cert, I deny the motion to lift the stay;
 5
 6
    what's your understanding of what happens then?
 7
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: If we are at -- if we're at the
 8
    Supreme Court on the petition for cert then we go forward
 9
    without the two parties.
10
             THE COURT: Okay. So all you need is a ruling from
11
    me, one way or the other.
12
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: Correct.
             THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. All right, anything
13
14
    else you want to add?
15
             MS. PARKER-LOWE: No, sir.
16
             THE COURT: Thank you very much.
17
             MR. ROSENBAUM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Norm
    Rosenbaum, Morrison & Foerster, for the debtors.
18
19
             Your Honor, it think it's important to just understand
    what's at stake here. What movants are seeking then, is relief
20
21
    from the automatic stay under which the debtors would then face
22
    the decision whether to petition the Supreme Court and go
23
    through that route --
24
             THE COURT: That's about the least compelling, from
25
    your standpoint, frankly. Just like the matter is going
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forward in the Maine Supreme Court in one of the cases, I mean, if the only issue were whether you were going to sign on to a petition for cert, I'm not particularly moved by that argument.

Okay?

MR. ROSENBAUM: That's fine. I understand. But that's just step one. I mean, if the cert's denied, then it's remanded back to the district court, in which case the debtors are defending really what are just monetary claims for damages under TILA and various North Carolina statutes.

THE COURT: So you -- whether it's binding on you or not, I think you would have to concede that if the Fourth Circuit decision stands, either because the Supreme Court denies cert or if they granted cert and affirmed that decision, whether it has a strict preclusive effect in the claims allowance process, it's going to have an impact. Would you agree with that?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I agree with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So pretty much, you're going to have to live with whatever happens in North Carolina. If the district court goes ahead and tries the case as to Deutsche Bank, and it comes down a really bad decision for Deutsche Bank -- I don't know whether all the issues are the same as to ResCap or not, but let's assume they're pretty much the same -- it isn't going to be helpful to you. Agreed?

MR. ROSENBAUM: We would probably be bound. There

1	would be a very strong preclusive effect in any claims				
2	resolution process, Your Honor. However, what movant is				
3	requesting is that we be drawn back into that litigation which				
4	is				
5	THE COURT: I know what they're asking.				
6	MR. ROSENBAUM: which is at step one. It was just				
7	on a motion to dismiss. We'd have to fully litigate it. Our				
8	position is that we want to maintain the integrity of our				
9	claims resolution process at this stage of the cases; and this				
10	is going to be an invitation for every other creditor to do the				
11	same.				
12	THE COURT: Okay. I understand that. Thank you very				
13	much, Mr. Rosenbaum.				
14	Ms. Parker-Lowe, anything you want to add?				
15	MS. PARKER-LOWE: I think the Court is duty-bound to				
16	look at each case on its own merits and not whether or not this				
17	is liable to open the floodgates, as the debtor				
18	THE COURT: Whether this is one of the 1,900 actions				
19	that are cited				
20	MS. PARKER-LOWE: That are cited by the				
21	THE COURT: in the affidavit in support of or in				
22	opposition to the lift stay motion.				
23	MS. PARKER-LOWE: Correct, Your Honor.				
24	THE COURT: I will look at each case individually.				
25	MS. PARKER-LOWE: Thank you.				

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1
             THE COURT: Thank you very much.
 2
             All right. I'm going to take this one under
 3
    submission as well. Thank you.
 4
             MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, may I just be heard?
             THE COURT: Yes.
 5
 6
             MR. ROSENBAUM: Briefly.
 7
             THE COURT: If it's about this, I've ruled already,
 8
    so --
             MR. ROSENBAUM: I just want to clarify, this motion
 9
10
    also requested the case be dismissed. I assume --
11
             THE COURT: Oh, let me just say --
12
             MR. ROSENBAUM: -- counsel is only moving on --
13
             THE COURT: -- I want to -- time out. Time out.
14
             MR. ROSENBAUM: Sorry.
             THE COURT: I've had I can't count the number of
15
16
    motions to dismiss this Chapter 11 case that have been raised
17
    so far, often by pro se parties, but sometimes by lawyers as
    well. The motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case is denied.
18
19
    The record in these Chapter 11 cases from petition date till
    today establishes there was a good-faith basis to file the
20
21
    cases. I don't intend to address the motion to dismiss in any
22
    decision I issue with respect to lift stay.
             I should have said this before. I'm treating this
23
24
    exclusively as the Gilbert motion to lift the automatic stay.
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So I'm saying this emphatically, because I keep getting these

25

motions to dismiss the Chapter 11 case, and never supported by any evidence, just assertions that the cases were filed in bad faith.

Everything that has occurred in this case since the petition date would establish to the contrary. There's substantial evidence in the record in the form of the first-day 1007 affidavit, numerous declarations that have been submitted in various contested matters in this case to date. This is a substantial case with serious issues. The Court concludes and finds that the case was filed in good faith, and whatever the outcome may ultimately be. So that portion of the motion is denied. The motion to lift the automatic stay is taken under advisement.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Klein?

MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Aaron Klein,
Morrison & Foerster for the debtors. I believe that concludes
our presentation for this afternoon unless --

THE COURT: Wells Fargo --

MR. KLEIN: There's one more? Wells Fargo? I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Wells Fargo.

MR. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Turner Smith with Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle. As Your Honor may know, we are conflicts counsel for the debtors. And we've been

	RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al. 15					
1	asked to take on this matter where we're facing					
2	THE COURT: I apologize. Just tell me your name one					
3	more time.					
4	MR. SMITH: I'm sorry. Turner Smith.					
5	THE COURT: Thank you. It's an					
6	MR. SMITH: You're welcome.					
7	THE COURT: easy one to remember, and I'm just					
8	tired.					
9	MR. SMITH: And it's my first time in this case, so					
10	THE COURT: Okay.					
11	MR. SMITH: Your Honor, we're close to having a					
12	resolution or a potential resolution, but not completely there.					
13	So let me just put it into context, and then I'll explain where					
14	we are. The case that the underlying case is a post-					
15	foreclosure money damages case. It's in the Central District					
16	of California.					
17	THE COURT: What judge?					
18	MR. BUNIN: Christina Snyder.					
19	MR. SMITH: Snyder. Thank you.					
20	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bunin.					
21	MR. SMITH: Christina Snyder. The plaintiff in that					
22	case has accepted the automatic stay and is not pressing an					
23	application to lift the stay. Wells Fargo or Wachovia faces					
24	ETS, which is the debtor entity, on cross claims as defendants.					

25 There are basically two sets of cross claims for indemnity. So

the issue before the Court is whether or not to lift the automatic stay with respect to prosecution of the Wells claim -- Wells Fargo claim against ETS.

Now, the benefit of having the motion practice is we now understand better and have had a productive dialog with the litigation counsel in the -- for Wells Fargo in the underlying case. And as we understand it, the key issue for them for lifting the stay, relates primarily to some discovery set of issues.

THE COURT: That was the second prong of their motion.

MR. SMITH: Right. And so we have what we believe to be a resolution at hand. But it comes in two parts. The first part is a resolution that's within the control of the two parties.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.

MR. SMITH: The second part depends upon what the court in the Central District does with respect to an application to extend the trial date. And we're not in a position today to tell you either we've made the application or that the judge has acted favorably on it. But if we can solve that second step, the first step will fall into place, and we'll have a global resolution of the application --

THE COURT: They're looking for a trial date --

MR. SMITH: -- in support --

THE COURT: -- in December?

```
MR. SMITH: The current trial date is December 4 of
 1
 2
    this year.
 3
             THE COURT: And what are they --
 4
             MR. SMITH: The --
                        -- what are they seeking?
 5
             THE COURT:
 6
             MR. SMITH: Well we are -- in our attempts to
 7
    cooperate with them on this two-pronged approach, one of the
 8
    issues is can we make available parties -- employees within our
    control for trial on December 4th. And as Your Honor knows
 9
10
    from looking at the papers, there is a burden associated with
11
    getting witnesses ready for trial. There's a very hands-on
    litigation department. If you haven't already seen that, you
12
    will over the course of the case. And December 4 comes at a
13
    very bad time in terms of the litigation department's work in
14
15
    this case and in the many other matters that they have to
16
    service.
17
             If we can move it out, if we can get the court to
18
    agree to move it out to the middle of January of 2013, then all
19
    the pieces fall into place and we can resolve this motion.
20
             THE COURT: All right. Let me say this. I don't want
21
    to ask questions or make any comments that make it any more
22
    difficult for the parties to reach an accommodation. When --
23
             MR. SHULMAN: Your Honor, Jeremy Shulman for the
24
    movant, Wells Fargo, on CourtCall.
25
             THE COURT: Yes.
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MR. SHULMAN: If I could be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. SHULMAN: I think the idea here, in part, was to sort of put the proposed issues before the Court, and if the Court is willing to weigh in on it, we'd be happy for a recommendation. Unfortunately, there's a little bit of a standstill which is out of our control, because the judge in the Central District controls the trial date.

For Wells Fargo's part, the alternative relief in the motion, at least we believe, is fairly clear on the law. We should be entitled to discovery of the ResCap affiliate, ETS, as a third-party witness, with respect to claims that Wells Fargo has to defend. And also that any trial subpoena that Wells Fargo would issue wouldn't be covered by the automatic stay anyway. But due to meet-and-confer efforts before filing this motion, we didn't want to get to the point of trial and have ETS take the position that their witnesses weren't going to show up and seek to hide behind the automatic stay. So we wanted to resolve this up front.

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you for a minute. What I need to know is, are you -- Mr. Smith seemed to be asking that this matter be deferred to allow you to try and conclude a resolution which would include asking Judge Snyder to adjourn the trial date. I'm listening to you, and it sounds like you're saying something just the opposite, that you want to

press your motion today. Which is it?

MR. SHULMAN: Well, I'm in a difficult position in that I sort of have to press my motion. But if we can agree on a short adjournment of this motion to go back to Judge Snyder, I'm happy to support any application to move the trial date. But as I've expressed to Mr. Smith in our meet-and-confer efforts, Judge Snyder's already moved the trial date, is aware of what we're trying to accomplish in the bankruptcy, and has expressed to me that she believes she's already given us enough time to do it.

So because of that, I'm a little leery of putting over the date for -- even to the next omnibus date in August.

Because if it's not resolved, and the trial date is not moved, and the existing discovery cutoff stands at September 17th, and we're at August 14th without a resolution, even if the motion is granted, attempting to get the discovery done in that time window and prepare a summary judgment motion due for filing a couple weeks later, becomes incredibly pressed, at best.

THE COURT: Okay. I need to know from the two of you whether this matter is going forward for a decision today or not. I don't want to know what problems you have. I've got problems. The next omnibus hearing date is August 14th. If the two of you agree, it'll be adjourned to then. You can contact Judge Snyder and see whether she'll move the trial date. If not, let's go forward and argue this motion.

MR. SHULMAN: Well, for the moving party, then my suggestion is to go forward and argue the motion. The resolution that we proposed before would be that there's an agreement to do the discovery and there's an agreement that they'll comply with any trial subpoena that's issued, and --

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to know about agreements. Because if there's an -- do you have an agreement that's been reflected in some writing, you're asking the Court to approve or if the Court's approval isn't required?

Agreements -- you know, both sides have to agree.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, Norm Rosenbaum. We're not involved in this matter, but Ms. Goliar (ph.) would like to confer with her counsel for a minute, if that's okay?

THE COURT: Okay. Let's -- all right, go ahead and confer with the counsel. We're going to hold off a minute while counsel confers in the courtroom.

MR. SHULMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. While we're doing that, let me just say, one of my law clerks pointed out to me that August 9th at 11 a.m. has a number of ResCap matters on. And so if the parties are in agreement to adjourn this to August 9th, that's a possibility. I'm not pressing anybody to do anything. I'm just -- I knew that the 14th, August 14th was an omnibus day. We've got a very crowded calendar as of now. But August 9th has just a few matter on it in ResCap.

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All right It's 3:25 on the clock in the courtroom.
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 2
    We're going to take a ten-minute recess while parties confer.
        (Recess from 3:22 p.m. until 3:36 p.m.)
 3
             THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record in
 4
    Residential Capital, number 12-12020. Mr. Smith?
 5
 6
             MR. SMITH: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. Turner Smith,
 7
    Curtis Mallet-Prevost. Time well spent over the break. I
    think we have a resolution of the motion. The debtors will
 8
    provide declarations to Wells Fargo for the case. And we
 9
10
    have -- that will take place over the coming weeks. And we've
    agreed to work with Mr. Shulman on getting those out the door.
11
12
             The second prong that we discussed before is the
13
    question of providing witnesses at trial. To the extent that
14
    we still employ witnesses who are -- we will accept a subpoena
15
    and produce them for trial. The parties have agreed that they
    will make a joint application to the judge in the Central
16
17
    District of California to move the trial date to some date
18
    after January 14 of 2013. But in order to resolve this motion,
19
    the debtors have agreed to live by the existing schedule if we
20
    cannot convince the judge to make that small adjustment to the
21
    trial date.
22
             THE COURT: All right. Let me ask the question.
    there been a discussion about document production?
23
24
             MR. SMITH: There have -- we have not discussed
25
    document production, but document production is complete,
```

1	actually, in the case, on our part. And the only discovery				
2	that we have discussed for purposes of resolving the case, is				
3	providing the declarations.				
4	THE COURT: Declarations for a summary judgment				
5	motion?				
6	MR. SMITH: As I understand it, they are intended to				
7	be used for summary judgment, yes.				
8	THE COURT: Okay.				
9	MR. SHULMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.				
10	THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want to add				
11	for Wells Fargo?				
12	MR. SHULMAN: The only caveat I would add is I presume				
13	that this will be settled by formal stipulation and order.				
14	THE COURT: Yes. That's what I would ask for. You				
15	ought to get a stipulation and order presented to the Court				
16	within the next week, certainly.				
17	MR. SMITH: We will do that, Your Honor. And in the				
18	meanwhile, we're going to move ahead with the two component				
19	parts, because time is running in the other case.				
20	THE COURT: All right. I'm glad you were able to				
21	resolve those issues.				
22	MR. SMITH: Thank you for the time to do that, Your				
23	Honor.				
24	THE COURT: Thank you very much.				
25	MR. SHULMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.				

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.

MS. FREJKA: Your Honor, Elise Frejka for the committee. Very quickly. We'd like to review a copy of the stipulation and order before it's submitted to Your Honor. We have been involved in the resolution of the two uncontested lift stay motions, and we've also been involved in the status and supporting the debtor in the three that went forward today. So --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MS. FREJKA: -- we are staying on top of things. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Marinuzzi, anything else?

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I think that finally concludes the calendar. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's just -- preview. August 9th is -- what do we have for August 9th? Retention applications, KPMG retention application, hearing on the KEIP-KERP --

MR. MARINUZZI: Correct, to the extent that's not concluded on the 8th. Yes. I'm hopeful that the retention applications will be straightforward. PWC may have some hairs on it because it relates to some of the issues discussed earlier today regarding obligations between the parent and ResCap in connection with the consent order.

	Pg 163 of 165		ı			
	RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al.	163				
1	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anybody else have					
2	anything they want to add?					
3	We're adjourned. Thank you.					
4	IN UNISON: Thank you, Your Honor.					
5	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:40 PM)					
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	Pg 164 01 165			164
				104
1				
2	INDEX			
3				
4	RULINGS			
5		Page	Line	
6	Motion to retain Towers Watson approved	107	18	
7	Motion to retain Fortace, LLC approved	108	2	
8	Debtors' motion to retain Severson &	108	12	
9	Werson approved			
10	Debtors' motion to extend time to file	108	21	
11	schedules and statements granted			
12	Centerview retention application approved	111	25	
13	subject to review of final order			
14	FTI retention application is approved	116	11	
15	U.S. Trustee's objection re: Moelis'	128	17	
16	retention application is sustained in part			
17	and overruled in part, as delineated on the			
18	record			
19	Committee's application to retain Moelis is	131	15	
20	granted as modified on the record			
21	Motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 cases is	152	18	
22	denied			
23	Stipulation and order to be presented to the	161	14	
24	Court on the Wells Fargo resolution			
25				

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